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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Purpose of the Evaluation 
The purpose is first, provide IDRC with an assessment of results from the most recent phase of 
the small research grant program (SRG) carried out by the Environmental Management 
Secretariat (EMS) between August 1999 and April 2002; and second, analyze the implications of 
this assessment for future programming; in particular to examine the market for the Secretariat's 
services and explore options for consolidating the process through more effective participation of 
ioclil gwvernincnis, cn:ianccd i-cscaroh c~paci:y six! 5raadcning :hc fundizg bzsc to icclude other 
entities with parallel or complementary interests. 
Methodology 
Assessment of SRG procedures was undertaken in three phases: i. review of background 
material; ii: discussions with EMS staff; and iii: field interviews. . Program results were evaluated 
from a sample of seven case studies. The sample was selected to represent a range of: 
environmental management issues (solid waste, water supply and sewerage) addressed through 
public-private partnerships (PPP); municipal-research center relationships; and methodologies. In 
the field visits discussions were held with various actors engaged in the conduct of the research 
and with those expected to be users of the research findings (see Box 1). The assessment of 
opportunities and constraints to improvement of the SRG process and implications for EMS' 
future program is derived exclusively from interviews with IDRC staff in Montevideo and the 
issues arising in the case studies. 
Program Performance 
EMS is clearly at the cutting edge of what the Johannesburg Summit has highlighted as 'Type-2" 
partnerships involving governments, business, NGOs and local community groups. The topic of 
PPPs in environmental management chosen by the EMS is highly relevant to municipal concerns. 
The bidding document was carefully specified and effectively distributed. The use of an external 
panel - representatives from the World Bank, UNDP and Habitat - was innovative and enabled 
rigorous, transparent selection and enrichment of the quality of proposals. Monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) of the grant cycle by EMS staff was constrained by: wide geographic 
distribution; resources available for effective follow-up; inconclusive progress reports; and 
difficulty in imposing quality control on technical reports which were submitted with full 
approval of the municipalities. Implementation of the program required 32 months -longer than 
expected. This was due to extended delays in some of the steps, particularly in time required to 
complete studies. The experience suggests that some phases could be accelerated and that a 
realistic period for a study approaches 12 months. 
Box 1 
Private - Public Partnership in 
Management of Solid Waste in El Salvador 
The San Salvador Metropolitan Area is illustrative of rapidly evolving incorporation of the private sector in 
provision of a public service linked to environmental management - disposal of solid waste for an urban 
population approaching 2 million. Since 1997 the Council of Mayors (14 municipalities) has undertaken a 
series of innovative measures with support of central government ministries, NGOs and several 
international donor agencies. These led to : creation of micro-enterprises at the community level for 
collection of household solid waste and street cleaning; transport of waste by municipal trucks or leasing 
arRngerneFtq ~x~i th  y i \ r p t ~  nyrators; and formatinn nf a mixed p~rhlic-private enterprise through a contract 
with a Canadian company to undertake activities such as closure of formal and informal rubbish dumps, 
operation of a new sanitary fill, technical assistance to municipal authorities, and environmental education. 
In June 2000 EMS provided a grant to the Council to sub-contract two Salvadorian research centers to 
undertake an evaluation of the dynamic process underway. The aim was to identify technical and 
institutional constraints impeding implementation of actions to strengthen public-private programs. The 
approach adopted was heavily oriented to participation by all the above actors and achieved a surprising 
degree of transparency on weaknesses in the system - ineffective bureaucracy, inertia, monopoly practices, 
non-coordination. Building on the strengths and constraints identified, the study made several 
recommendations for change which were discussed with the Council and in meetings with other actors in 
early 2001. Since that time the Council has established a unit for supervising contracts in solid waste 
disposal and is negotiating a $70,000 grant from the UNDP to implement a number of recommendations in 
two municipalities. In addition, a recently approved $80 million IDB loan will be largely oriented to solid 
waste management. Many local authorities use the study as a manual for contracting with micro- 
enterprises. On the negative side, the Government has recently enacted a law prohibiting contracts for 
services of more than one year. This has a perverse impact on credit availability. All these elements, 
combined with a major move by the Government in 1991 towards decentralization - an increase from 1% 
to 7% in the allocation of the national budget to municipalities - give an idea of the highly dynamic context 
in which the EMS grant was implemented, and in which study recommendations may be adopted. 
SRG Performance 
The EMS program over six years has involved a total IDRC investment of $600,000, primarily in 
38 research grants. The most recent call for proposals led to eight grants ($1 10,000). When one 
compares this program with many of the large technical assistance programs supported by 
international donors, it must without doubt be judged as highly cost-effective. The niche EMS has 
carved out for itself in introducing a high "knowledge" content largely explains this effectiveness. 
It has been particularly successful in its poverty orientation. All cases focus on the role of micro- 
enterprises associated with low-income urban communities. However, in the area of generating an 
autonomous demand for policy-relevant research it was less successful; in the institutional 
context governing decision-making in most municipalities progress on this score appears some 
way off. 
Aside from the above areas, the program was expected to contribute to strengthening capacity of 
senior technical staff and policy makers in municipal governments, which in the medium and 
long term should lead to  improved policy formulation and implementation. There has been 
strengthening of staff and policy makers but the impact has been constrained by two factors: 
limited staff participation in the research; and lack of career paths and high turn-over' of senior 
policy makers (political appointees). However, it is difficult to take the next step and suggest 
tangible change in policy attributable to SRGs in those four or five cases where there have been 
relatively active staff participation and continuity of mayoral leadership. The issue here centers 
on the overall context of change in which the municipalities operate. In all cases they have had 
wide-ranging portfolios of grant-funded activities, some going back 10-15 years. In addition, in 
six of the case studies, the research center had already been engaged in projects with the 
municipalities on the research topic for periods ranging from three to ten years, and expects to 
continue the relationship. Under these circumstances it was decided not to attempt to forecast a 
counterfactual "without grant" scenario from which one might speculate on change "attributable" 
to an SRG. An approximation of the relative performance of the grants is given in Table 1 and 
Box 1 illustrates how impacts have or may have evolved in one case. 
In retrospect, it could be argued that the real impact of the program should not be measured by 
the precise change in capacity or policy in a particular municipality, but rather from the multiplier 
effect from networking, documenting and disseminating tests of innovative methodologies or 
evaluation of innovative experiences. EMS has placed all technical reports on the Web. Two 
research centers have published in journals and presented papers in conferences. All intend to 
publish a summary report. In three cases the studies have led to follow-up grants from other 
donors promoted by the research centers and another three intend to propose follow-up. It is 
noteworthy that the municipalities themselves have not taken the initiative. It appears that more 
could be done in follow-up and dissemination of the innovative aspects of the SRG process. 
Operational Issues 
The evaluation raises a number of issues bearing on how IDRC might proceed with the EMS 
initiative. Unlike programs or projects, the Secretariat is intended to become a permanent entity 
with a sustainable source of funding. Many similar IDRC experiences suggest that consolidation 
of such an entity will be relatively long-term. In addition, due to the nature of the institutional 
context, there are risks as is evident from the foregoing discussion which implies a degree of 
instability and scarcity of human, financial and institutional capital in the hands of local 
governments. Nevertheless, the risks associated with the program are associated with high pay- 
offs - given the process of change underway in decentralization, community participation, equity 
and environmental management in which municipalities will play a critical role. Considering the 
track record and contacts established in the field of local government environmental management 
over the past six years, it is essential to capitalize on this and retain the focus rather than broaden 
into other sectors. 
The SRG program should be the axis of the Secretariat's operations. It generates knowledge on 
innovative experience and provides legitimacy in that it allows EMS to have direct dialogue with 
local government authorities who constitute the end-users of the experience expected to result in 
change of policy and other institutional arrangements. However, a number of modifications 
might be considered such as: (i) develop the basis for a typology of bidding documents; (ii) take 
steps to increase municipality involvement - require internal workshops and meetings with other 
relevant actors to discuss research findings, allow use of grant funds to hire senior staff members 
on a part-time basis for the study team, require submission of a summary report for publication 
subject to EMS review, and provide travel funds for a staff member to present the case in a 
regional or international meeting; and (iii) have the Secretariat play a more pro-active role in the 
grant cycle, particularly in quality control of the published report and in ex post evaluation and 
related follow-up to maintain momentum developed in the study, exploit leverage of the research 
findings through other donor or loan initiatives, or remedy shortfalls in performance. . 
Given the long-run objective of the Secretariat, there should be consideration of expanding non- 
SRG activities. Special studies (undertaken originally by EMS and staff) oriented to developing a 
framework for actions aimed at the objective should be a high priority. Other areas might include: 
publications to provide greater visibility to the Secretariat, workshops and networking with a 
broader range of potential clients than that established to date. A component of the special 
studies, workshop, publication and networking activities, could be oriented to evolving the 
agenda for transition of EMS to a self-sustaining entity. 
The fundamental challenge facing EMS is how to orchestrate the SRG and non-SRG activities to 
establish a sustainable financial base. The evaluation suggests that the current clientele - 
municipalities and research centers - can be expected to provide logistical and staff support, but 
not significant funding. Thus, the broadened intellectual and financial base will derive from the 
set of large national and international suppliers of technical assistance, grants and loans, whose 
concern is the environmentlpoverty aspects of local government policies, programs and projects. 
EMS needs to work with these two sets of clients through the range of options open, to define (by 
successive approximation) the next phase of the Secretariat - nature of the governing body, 
organization, critical mass (budget) and priority activities. Strengthened actions, complementary 
to the research grants aimed at clarifying the priorities and agendas of the municipalities, local 
communities, the private sector, NGOs and other donors appear crucial in this process. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This evaluation covers implementation of the most recent segment of the competitive small 
research grant (SRG) program administered by the Environmental Management Secretariat 
(EMS). The bidding document for the program was distributed in August, 1999 and final 
payment on the last grant -thus closing this segment - was made in April, 2002. 
1.1. Methodology 
The approach to the evaluation is based on the terms of reference (TOR) prepared by EMS in 
consultation with the Evaluation Unit of IDRC (see Annex A). Assessment of EMS procedures 
and performance in administering the program is based on discussions with staff of the Secretariat 
and previous review of files relating to preparation of the bidding document, its distribution, 
proposal selection and the grant cycle. In the latter area in-depth review was made of the seven 
grants chosen as case studies (see Annex B). The findings from this assessment are presented in 
Section 2. 
Evaluation of the realized or expected outcomes of the research process and technical reports is 
based exclusively on the cases presented in Annexes C-I which were selected to represent a range 
of: environmental management issues addressed through public-private partnerships (PPP); 
municipality-research center relationships; and research methodologies. In these cases field visits 
were made for discussions with municipal officials who participated in and were responsible for 
administering the research, and with the study director (and staff) of the research center sub- 
contracted by the municipality. In those cases where it appeared relevant, discussions were also 
held with representatives of other participants in the research process - community micro- 
enterprises, NGOs and corporations providing services in potable water supply, sewerage and 
solid waste disposal (see Annex J). 
The framework for evaluation of the SRG program performance is based on the conceptual 
papers prepared by the EMS and the 1999 bidding document and its annexes. The bidding 
document is clear on the purposes of the SRG program: 
a) The focus will be systematic generation, accumulation and dissemination of 
knowledge on PPPs in urban environmental management; 
b) research on PPPs to generate this knowledge must promote association between 
municipal authorities and research centers, and must be relevant to improved 
formulation and implementation of policy for environmental management; and 
c) the research will have: 
two general objectives related to provision of better and sustainable urban 
environmental services - access to new financing mechanisms and - new 
institutional models - based on broad participation of public, private and NGO 
stakeholders (particularly low-income groups e.g. through community micro- 
enterprises) who progressively recognize social responsibility in a context of on- 
going decentralization; and 
specific objectives covering: - development of new methodology (based on a 
case study) for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the process of PPPs and the 
role of the various stakeholders in the above financial mechanisms and 
institutional models, and/or the application of existing methodology (in a case 
study) to the evaluation of options for design of new financial mechanisms and 
institutional models based on testing hypotheses with respect to: 
strategies and programs for promoting partnerships among 
government, private corporate enterprise, financing institutions, local 
communities and NGOs 
the role played by these various stakeholders 
measurement of performance of these new mechanisms and models in 
terms of improved water supply and solid waste disposal service 
(access, coverage, quality, price), economic efficiency, employment, 
equity and environmental sustainability. 
The expected impact of the program, set out in the bidding document, is that the participatory 
research process and the accumulation and dissemination of the knowledge generated will 
contribute to: more efficient and expanded environmental services; increased employment and 
equity; and an improving process of environmental management in urban areas. At this stage the 
probabilities that such impacts may eventually be attributable to the program depend on a 
judgment on its expected contribution to the following outcomes: 
increased capacity of professionals in municipal government to address the issues in 
exploring new financing mechanisms and new PPP institutional models for providing 
urban environmental services on a sustainable basis; 
increased capacity of all stakeholder groups involved in PPP to address the above issues, 
with particular emphasis on low income communities organized to run micro-enterprises; 
demonstration of new viable mechanisms and models which have been either 
documented and evaluated, or tested (or should be tested) through action-research; 
dissemination of knowledge relevant to the above outcomes, in expectation of multiplier 
effects, though horizontal cooperation, the media and publications or papers presented in 
national and international fora; and,. 
deriving from the above, creation of new or expanded demand by municipalities for 
services of research centers in support of decision-making on urban environmental policy 
and management. 
1.2. The evaluation process 
The evaluation was initiated on July 29,2002 with discussions in Montevideo with IDRC staff on 
the scope and nature of the assessment to be made. The performance criteria specified in the 
TOR were reviewed together with the interpretation of EMS objectives outlined above. It was 
agreed that the assessment would be fully participatory in seeking the views of a wide range of 
actors concerned with the conduct of the study and the use of the results - the research center, 
municipality, NGOs, other donors, corporate enterprises, community committees and micro- 
enterprises - during the field visits. It was also determined that the purpose of the evaluation 
would be two-fold - first, to assess achievements of the SRGs; and second, to identify 
opportunities for improving efficiency in EMS' approach, such as: change in procedures and 
scope, reallocation of resources, or exploration of new areas for incorporation of other donors. 
The task was undertaken over a six-week period ending SeptemberlO, 2002 with a maximum 
commitment of 35 working days, of which 20 were spent in field visits. With travel, national 
holidays and weekends, the average time spent in interviews for each case was about one and a 
half days. This limited the breadth of contact with participants and potential users of the research. 
The tradeoffs between quality of the evaluation and time spent in the participatory process are 
discussed in Section 4. The evaluation of SRG performance is presented in Section 3. 
1.3. Operational implications for EMS 
In response to points (e) and (g) in the TOR (Annex A), the key issues which appear to have 
favored or hindered achievement of the grant objectives are analyzed in each case study (Annexes 
C-I). Based on this analysis, an assessment is made in Section 4 of options for improvement or 
modification of procedures which may enhance program results. Issues arising from the 
evaluation for transforming the Secretariat into a permanent entity are discussed in Section 5. 
2. SRG PROGRAM PROCEDURES 
2.1. Rationale and clarity of the bidding document 
In July 1999 representatives of the World Bank, Habitat, the UNDP and Yale University were 
invited to participate in the process of design of the bidding document, promotion of the call for 
SRG applications, evaluation of research proposals and selection. The framework and objectives 
of the SRG program, discussed in Section 1, are well presented in the bidding document, which 
was prepared in Spanish, Portuguese and English. The rationale for the program, based on 
IDRC's Mexico International Meeting (November 1998). is well argued. The topic of PPPs in 
environmental management is a clear priority for municipalities in the emerging process of 
decentralization, privatization, participatory planning and progressive involvement of low-income 
urban communities in activities to improve environmental services and health. The fact that 68 
municipalities responded to the call for proposals is a direct reflection of the clear statement of 
the issue and its relevance to immediate concerns. 
2.2. Distribution of the bidding document 
Since 1996 EMS has developed an extensive network of contacts with municipalities and 
research centers throughout Latin America specialized in analysis and evaluation of policies and 
actions related to improving environmental quality in urban areas. The document was put on the 
EMS Web site and on the IDRC bulletin "We Share" (750 subscribers) on August 31, 1999. E- 
mails were sent to a selected set of institutions. Canadian embassies in the region disseminated 
the document and the international agencies on the selection panel distributed it through their 
networks. Municipalities were given two months to present a summary proposal covering 
preliminary ideas on seven points in design and implementation of the research. The procedure is 
judged to be comprehensive, fully adequate and efficiently executed. 
2.3. Screening of summary proposals 
The staff of EMS reviewed the summary proposals in terms of nine selection criteria. Of the 68 
proposals, 23 were rejected as being outside the terms of reference. The remainder were sent to 
the selection panel which applied the same selection criteria and identified a short list of 12 where 
applicants were asked to prepare detailed proposals. Both the selection criteria and their 
application in this screening process were respectively appropriate and transparent. 
2.4. Project selection 
EMS has placed particular emphasis on application of a technically rigorous and transparent 
process of screening the detailed proposals. The independent panel used 11 weighted criteria to 
establish an order of priority. Since the panel members are drawn from agencies which have 
programs in urban development the quality of the eight proposals finally selected benefited from 
their suggestions. Final selection was based on an exchange of correspondence and a conference 
call with the panel. Announcement of the successful candidates was made in March 2000. The 
process is innovative and effective. 
2.5. M&E of the grant cycle 
The grant agreements contain provisions that enable EMS to follow research progress and 
exercise a degree of quality control - a progress report is required at the end of the second month 
of implementation; EMS staff or consultants may visit the project site during implementation for 
discussion with any of the actors involved; submission of financial and technical reports; and 
presentation by the municipality of an "evaluation letter" indicating the linkage between research 
results and its policies. The progress report proved to be a largely routine procedure; only in one 
instance did it lead EMS to require a change in scope or methodology of the research. In order to 
foster independent action by the municipalities and research centers it was decided to undertake 
M&E at a distance - e-mail, telephone, etc., rather than engage in routine M&E field visits. The 
financial reports were all submitted and certified. However, the technical reports proved difficult 
to use as a vehicle for quality control. In five of the seven cases, EMS made comments on draft 
technical reports, but it was seen as potentially counter-productive to reject a final technical 
report certified by a municipality. This was particularly true when the government changed in the 
course of the research. Four of the "evaluation letters" offered constructive comments. The 
remainder provided no meaningful insights on the relevance of the research to proposed change in 
organization or policy formulation and implementation. Two factors contributed to this situation. 
First, the requirement to provide an evaluation of the relevance of research results essentially at 
the same time as the presentation of the technical report gave the municipal authorities little time 
to reflect on the probability and direction of change in policy as a consequence of the research. 
Second, in those cases where mayors and/or senior officials were replaced in the course of the 
research, the incoming authorities did not feel capable of in-depth assessment of results. In 
review, technical and institutional factors proved to be significant constraints to EMS' ability to 
undertake effective M&E. 
2.6. EMS efficiency in administration 
The work required to deal with this multi-phase process involving a large number of interested 
parties proved to be extremely demanding. Implementation of the program required 32 months to 
complete. All summary proposals were received within the time allowed. The two-tiered 
screening process leading to final project selection required five months. Contract negotiations 
ranged from one to three months. Processing of the initial grant disbursement in most cases 
required three months. Thus, studies were initiated 12-14 months after distribution of the bidding 
documents. Although these documents specified a six-month study period, in practice only one 
complied with this stipulation, the remainder ranging from 10 to 18 months. EMS procedures for 
report approval and final disbursement were completed in less than two months of receipt of 
reports. 
These procedures appear to be drawn out - although in a number of steps this was beyond EMS'S 
control. On the basis of this experience the Secretariat should be able to accelerate program 
implementation. 
3. SRG PERFORMANCE 
The overall performance of the SRG program is assessed here in terms of the extent to which the 
process of generation and dissemination of knowledge may be expected to contribute to more 
efficient and sustainable environmental management and poverty alleviation in urban areas 
through: identification andor validation of innovative financing mechanisms and institutional 
models for PPP as an instrument for improved environmental management, particularly in low- 
income urban communities; strengthened capacity of municipalities to engage in PPPs; change in 
capacity and attitudes towards social responsibility among other actors in the PPP process; and 
creation of new demands by municipalities for policy-relevant studies contracted with research 
centers. 
3.1. Poverty alleviation 
The virtually exclusive focus of the 1999 SRGs on the role of micro-enterprises associated with 
low-income urban communities classifies the program as poverty-oriented. The population of the 
specific target groups is 64,000 in La Paz, 4,000 in San Fernando, 4,000 in Salto and 20,000 in 
Municipality of Villa Maria del Triunfo (MVMT). In the remaining studies one may assume the 
target group to be all the urban poor within the municipality. 
3.2. Strengthened capacity of municipalities 
The probability that the grant process may have increased the capacity of municipal staff varies 
widely, according to the institutional context of the case (see Box 2). In the cases: of TomC, 
MVMT, San Salvador, and Municipality of Sao Bernardo do Campo (MSBC) the studies made a 
useful contribution due to the active staff involvement, meetings with division directors and 
internal staff seminars. San Fernando represents an intermediate situation. In Salto there was 
probably little impact. In La Paz staff turn-over precluded any significant strengthening. 
Although individual staff members in the municipalities have been enriched from association 
with the studies, two questions remain: 
First, what are the probabilities of change in the institution itself - the rules of the game - in 
seeking greater community participation or more workable partnerships with the private and 
NGO sectors? The answer seems in large part to hinge on turn-over of staff and elected 
municipal councilors which influences discontinuity of policy and limited motivation within the 
municipal bureaucracy to be performance-oriented. The extreme cases are Salto and La Paz 
where the combination of these elements conspire against strengthening the institution. 
Second, how much of any change expected in the capacity of the municipality may be attributable 
to the grant? In all cases except Salto, the research centers involved had been associated with the 
municipalities on the precise topic of each study for periods ranging from three to ten years. 
Thus, the grants were seen as a means of: evolving a whole new PPP dimensions as in MSBC; 
developing new operational procedures in municipalities for PPP as in San Salvador; evaluating a 
model e.g. San Fernando; or follow-up to refine a model e.g. MVMT and TomC. In several cases 
the research centers expect continued involvement for a number of years, as in T Q ~ C ,  San 
Fernando and MVMT. Thus, one might conclude that it will be impossible to isolate the degree 
of change attributable to a 6-12 month study in an on-going stream of grant-funded activities 
ranging from action research to facilitation in community development. Under these 
circumstances no attempt was made to forecast the counterfactual municipal technical and 
managerial capacity "without" the grant. 
Box 2 
Capacity Building for Environmental Management 
The MVMT study (p. 41) specifically addressed a basic lack of communication and internal coordination in 
the municipality which constrained effective formulation and implementation of environmental policy. 
Similarly, in San Salvador (p. 99) inadequate human resources limited action, and the study (p.106) 
included numerous activities (discussions, workshops) designed to initiate improvement in this situation. 
The f x u s  in the MSBC c x e  ( p p .  22 23) T,vx :eavi!;. xiested to ir.fgrx;..a:ion exckange as a basis for 
capacity building among all potential actors - the technical committee of the municipality, NGOs, 
community organizations and industry associations. Lessons learned from the Tom6 experience (pp 50-5 1) 
served as a model for contracts between communities and local governments in other municipalities. This 
study also provided the basis for regional workshops incorporating staff from eleven municipalities on re- 
design of education programs for solid waste management. 
3.3. Change in municipal policy formulation and implementation 
The extent to which the studies may be expected to contribute to effective change in policy runs 
parallel to strengthened capacity of municipal council members and senior staff. Uniformly 
senior managers have expressed considerable interest in the research results. However, to 
translate this interest into a more coordinated approach to environmental management by the 
relevant municipal departments appears to depend on the dynamics of the process into which the 
study was inserted (see Box 3). In all cases lack of financial resources is cited as a constraint to 
policy change. Where major technical assistance projects or infrastructure loans are 
contemplated, as in the cases of San Salvador, MVMT and Tomi, one may expect ideas from the 
studies to influence decisions. 
From this review of EMS experience, it is concluded that the opportunity for a grant to contribute 
to change in policy is constrained in many cases by the intractable bureaucratic structure of 
municipalities which limits internal coordination, and prolonged time periods for structural 
modifications. The evidence suggests that if studies are to lead to significant change in this 
aspect perseverance will be required in follow-up with higher visibility of the Secretariat in the 
process. This relates to point (3.5) 
Box 3 
Knowledge-Based Change in Environmental Policy 
The SRGs provide insights on the potential for knowledge to change policy. In MSBC (pp 42-43) the 
research placed particular emphasis on the links between the municipality and the private sector in the 
sphere of public policy, where corporate interests assume social responsibility rather than the traditional 
"assistance" approach. In San Salvador (p.6) the municipal authorities accepted the principle of taking 
politically unpopular decisions in order to provide more sustainable and financially viable environmental 
services. The La Paz case (p.44) draws attention to the importance of education aimed at a better 
distribution of responsibilities between society and the local government. Experience from MVMT (p.12) 
shows environmental policy to be more effective when local organizations are in a position to establish 
effective cooperation with the municipality, thus minimizing the traditional approach of treating 
communities as clients. 
3.4. Strengthened capacity of non-municipal actors in the PPP process 
As indicated above the focus of all cases has been on the interface between facilitation and 
action-research aimed at strengthening community micro-enterprises and, in the process, 
validating methodology. To varying degrees all studies improved the capacity of organizations in 
low-income communities and their associated micro-enterprises to better manage their operations 
and more efficiently negotiate with municipal or central government authorities. Where the 
orientation is heavily towards promotion and facilitation of community micro-enterprises, as for 
example in MVMT, the direct strengthening of a specifically identified target group (three 
communities) is relatively easy to document. In more macro-oriented action-research 
approaches, such as MSBC, the strengthening is more diffuse but at the same time is on a wider 
scale. 
Because of their past associations with the municipalities, the research centers see themselves as 
major actors in the PPP process. The International Institute for Environment and Development - 
Am6rica Latina (IIED-AL) has not only contributed to organization of low-income communities 
in the San Fernando municipality and to facilitation of their negotiations with the local authorities 
and the French-owned water supply enterprise, but also has negotiated significant grant funding 
for infrastructure over the past decade. The Centro de Educacidn y Tecnologia ( CET) has played 
a similar role in Tom6 since 1982 and expects to continue this relationship at lest until 2004. 
EcoCiudad was a major player in the $18 million EEC-funded ten-year program for water supply 
through low-income community micro-enterprises in Lima. This meant extensive association 
with MVMT and it expects to maintain contact as a member of the NGO consortium which will 
implement the World Bank loan for follow-up to the EEC program. In the case of MSBC, 
POLIS, as an institute for research, training and technical assistance on social policies, sees itself 
as a contributor of innovative ideas - not a mere facilitator. POLIS also has credibility with the 
municipality because of its capacity to draw powerful private enterprise and civil society groups 
into negotiation of PPP. Under these circumstances the SRG program has undoubtedly improved 
the capacity of these entities to play a constructive role in PPP for urban environmental 
management. One may raise the same question applied above to municipalities on strengthening 
of individuals vis a vis institutions, where the latter may be expected to have sustainable impact. 
The probability of institutionalizing the impact is likely to be significantly higher in the case of 
research centers. 
Where private corporations were contracted by municipalities for water supply, sewerage or solid 
waste disposal (Clirna Sky in La Paz, AASA in San Fernando, MIDAS in San Salvador, and 
Vega Ambiental in MSBC), participation in the studies was minimal. This is no surprise since 
the SRG bidding document is explicit that the "study of PPP mechanisms should be oriented to 
promotion, analysis, employment generation, efficiency and financing of micro, small and 
medium local enterprises". However, the cases suggest that these corporations are, or could be, 
major players in association with local communities, in providing services to low-income groups. 
An issue here is the institutional arrangements (e.g. transparency, "level playing field") and 
technical and managerial capabilities of municipal, local community and corporate actors. In this 
macro context, any capacity strengthening would derive from speculation that the grants might be 
credited with initiation of a long-term PPP process. In fact, the same speculation would apply to 
eventual impact on all actors. The question arising here is whether one could be more conclusive 
or less speculative if the Secretariat were to engage in selective follow-up discussed in Section 4. 
3.5. Generation of follow-up activities 
In MVMT the follow-up with FOBlDA in consolidation of the association of micro-enterprises 
was promoted by EcoCiudad; it also promoted a request to EMS from the municipality to fund 
establishment of a new division for environment and publication of a study report. CET was 
largely responsible for a $125,000 grant from a Belgian NGO - Flanders - in solid waste 
recycling in TomC. It was also influential in a $750,000 EEC project for 12 municipalities (one of 
which is TomC) in south-central Chile in the same field. In San Salvador, PRISMA was 
instrumental in having the municipality submit a request to UNDP for $70,000 to implement the 
study findings. In the case of the PPP process tested in MSBC, POLIS is interested in follow-up 
to cany the action-research on private participation to a further stage in the wider context of the 
Municipality of Sao Paulo. In La Paz, the Prohabitat project director wishes to promote an action- 
oriented project with the newly-formed semi-autonomous agency (SIREMU) within the 
municipality charged with regulation of contracts with the private sector (corporations and 
community micro-enterprises) for social services. 
From the foregoing it is concluded that the SRGs have generated considerable interest in follow- 
up. However, initiatives are being taken largely by the research centers involved rather than the 
municipalities. This aspect appears particularly relevant to the role of the studies in strengthening 
staff and changing policy discussed above. 
3.6. Generation and dissemination of knowledge 
Under the SRG program knowledge was to be generated through case studies which developed 
new methodology for, or applied existing methodology to specification, evaluation or validation 
of innovative financing mechanisms and institutional models for PPP in urban environmental 
management. The prime focus of all studies was mechanisms for creating or strengthening low- 
income community enterprises (micro-enterprises) which would be part of a PPP system 
involving the municipality, NGOs, and in some cases corporate enterprises, to provide 
environment services through management of solid waste, potable water and sewerage. 
However, the points of entry in this focus vary among the seven cases. None of them address the 
issue of innovative funding mechanisms. However, in the area of innovative institutional models 
for PPP, they provide valuable insights on the opportunities and constraints to improved 
environmental management through such partnerships. The cases of Salto, San Fernando, 
MVMT, La Paz and TomC are all heavily oriented to action-research in formation or operation of 
viable micro-enterprises. La Paz and San Fernando also reflect issues where PPP involves major 
private corporations in solid waste management and water supply respectively. The San Salvador 
case is oriented to the regulatory and contractual framework through which the 14 municipalities 
in the metropolitan area deal with micro-enterprises in solid waste management. The MSBC case 
represents a completely different approach. A mechanism is explored to get private enterprise 
involved at a sectoral level (CIESP) as a partner with the municipality and NGOs in formulating a 
program for residual solids management (incorporating micro-enterprises) and providing funds 
and management expertise for its implementation. 
The cases all relate to assessment of innovative institutional models for PPP. However, the 
critical issues bearing on performance are - quality and relevance of knowledge to decision- 
making; and - its dissemination primarily via publications, but also through horizontal 
cooperation, seminars or wider conferences sponsored by professional or sector associations. 
The technical reports submitted by the municipalities in compliance with their EMS contracts are 
of mixed quality. The fact that they are submitted by the municipal authority or, in the case of La 
Paz and San Fernando (where contracts were directly with the research center), are accompanied 
by an approval letter from the authority, carries the implication that reports are of good quality 
and relevant to decisions. In two cases the technical reports do not meet these requirements. 
Another case report provides an excellent evaluation of a PPP model and methodology in 
participatory action-research, but goes on to make a number of gratuitous non-operational 
recommendations in the conclusions. One or two other reports tend towards a "conventional 
wisdom" check-list approach on the conclusions and recommendations which detracts from what 
are otherwise excellent studies. 
All technical reports submitted under the research contracts have been disseminated by EMS via 
the Web. San Fernando and MSBC are widely regarded as examples of "best practice" in Latin 
America and therefore offer a potential to EMS for high visibility. IIED-AL and POLIS have 
published journal articles and presented papers in national and international meetings related to 
their respective cases. CET is preparing a video on recycling based on its Tom6 experience over 
the past five years. Six of the research centers involved in the SRG program have plans to 
publish executive summary type reports in association with their municipal partners. Since there 
was not contractual obligation with EMS, there appears to have been limited incentive for action 
- publication is still pending. six to 18 months after formal study completion. These delays may 
be ascribed to lack of funds in some cases or relatively low priority in allocation of time by the 
prime authors. Aside from these prospective publications no further action is currently planned 
for dissemination. 
3.7. Creation of research demand in municipalities 
Over the past 10-20 years the municipal authorities covered in this evaluation have had extensive 
links with NGOs and non-profit research centers of the type that performed the research in the 
SRG program. It is probably safe to say that in no case were there contractual arrangements 
under which these centers received payment from the municipality, although there were 
counterpart inputs in terms of staff time and logistic support. The funding either came from: 
standard core support of the centers themselves, e.g. IJED-AL, CET, Prohabitat, POLIS or 
EcoCiudad; central government programs for social development and the environment, e.g. 
FOSIS in Chile; or from international sources (GTZ, EEC, UNICEF, foundations, etc.). As a 
result of this experience, the municipalities are completely attuned to the receipt of grant funds to 
support studies or community development activities. Further, in poor municipalities such as 
MVMT, Tom6 or Salto, part of the cost of consulting contracts - such as engineering design - is 
normally covered by special central government programs to support backward areas, e.g. 
FONCODES in Peru. With the exception of MSBC, the other six municipalities in the sample 
addressed here are notoriously short of funds. Most of the time they appear to be in a "fire- 
fighting" mode, dealing with short-run crises and conflicts. They are usually in the position of 
reacting to outside circumstances rather than taking initiative. Many of the ideas for initiatives 
come from central government agencies, NGOs or international entities which provide funds. 
This situation, coupled with a long history of concessionary funding would suggest that the 
"culture" of contracting research of the type funded by EMS is virtually non-existent. EMS is 
seen as another source of grants similar to those listed above. 
The cases suggest that the real clients served by EMS are the research centers. The municipal 
authorities appear to show little interest in accessing the Web, reviewing bidding documents 
supplied by other means or contacting research centers to design proposals consistent 'with both 
their own policy priorities and the Secretariat's specifications. This tendency towards municipal 
inertia in responding to the opportunity EMS has provided suggests slow progress towards 
generation of effective demand for research services. 
4. OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
The foregoing discussion of program performance implies a number of questions on whether 
EMS might consider modification in some of its activities to improve probability of impact. 
4.1. Project selection 
As indicated in Section 2, EMS currently follows rigorous project selection procedures under 
which proposals are evaluated by a highly qualified independent panel which applies a set of 
weighted criteria. In spite of the impeccable objectivity of this process there may be reason to 
consider some modification. 
Measures aimed at maximizing probability of ''success" 
The application of such measures could involve EMS in considerably more homework before it 
submits the proposals to the selection panel. From these seven cases, there appear to be a few 
pre-conditions which may contribute to improved performance in the seven indicators reviewed 
in Section 3: 
relative stability of the municipal authority receiving the grant 
strong previous linkages between the research center to be sub-contracted and the 
municipality 
structure and technical and administrative capacity of the staff which suggests effective 
management of the grant 
involvement of a research center which, aside from demonstrated facilitation and action- 
research capabilities, has a track record in high quality publications and participation in 
relevant national and international professional and sector association meetings. 
In considering these elements it is evident that in general EMS has mobilized high quality 
research centers with years of experience in working with the municipal grantee. Also, most of 
the municipalities exhibited a high degree of stability with mayors in office for two or three 
terms. 
Four problems arise in implementing selection criteria such as those suggested above. First, it is 
unlikely that EMS could form a meaningful judgment of these aspects from review of a written 
proposal. Second, there is a strong element of subjectivity when one attempts to assess 
qualitative characteristics of the municipal authority or the research center. Third, this would 
increase EMS'S overhead costs (in developing the necessary background materials for the 
selection panel) and cause delay in the selection process. And, fourth, EMS might be seen as 
trying to strengthen the municipalities and centers which are already strong (even though this 
maximizes probability of an innovative study which will be acted upon). As the saying goes, 
"nothing succeeds like success". This is illustrated by the San Fernando municipality and MSBC, 
considered as models, where NGOs and other donors, plus lending agencies are more than willing 
to provide funds and technical assistance to test new ideas. Should EMS be concerned with 
strengthening relatively weaker institutions - municipalities, NGOs, research centers etc., 
engaged in PPPs? 
Measures to maximize expected relevancy 
Six criteria are already applied by EMS to a judgment on relevancy. However, one might 
consider two tests of relevancy - that applied by the municipality in the selection of the research 
topic and design of the proposal and - that applied by EMS with respect to the Secretariat's Latin 
American agenda (Sections 1 and 5). In the former test, if the role of the municipality is passive, 
relevancy might be determined by the research center. If this question is to be addressed EMS 
needs to expend more resources in dialogue with the municipal authorities. In the latter case, 
EMS might consider developing a typology of situations (municipalities, PPP models, 
methodological approaches) where it could determine whether balance across the range or a 
degree of concentration is more "relevant" to its agenda. 
Poverty alleviation focus 
As already indicated the program (reflected from the seven cases) is heavily poverty-oriented. 
Three cases dealt with metropolitan areas and the remainder addressed mid-sized municipalities 
where the focus was on specific target groups of urban poor. If the absolute number of poor were 
to be a criterion for EMS performance, one might expect project selection to minimize case 
studies which applied to only 2,000 - 3,000 families; and to favor broader studies of PPP policy 
in large urban complexes. If this were to be the case, stratification of the client "universe" and 
targeting the bidding documents could be considered. 
4.2. Contract conditions 
The cases examined in this evaluation suggest consideration be given to a number of elements in 
the contract. 
Time frame 
It is evident that if the research addresses aspects such as the technical, economic and social 
feasibility of a theoretical or proposed PPP model or ex post evaluation of an existing model, it 
could be accomplished within six months. However, all the proposals called for extensive 
contacts with low-income communities and a sequence of negotiations with various actors in the 
PPP process. This precludes completion in less than about 12 months. 
Achievable objectives 
It is difficult for EMS to judge whether the objectives are reasonable without knowledge of: 
previous work conducted by the research center with the municipality (in some cases this was 
considerable); and the likelihood of receiving the quality and quantity of counterpart inputs 
expected from those involved. The bidding document is abundantly clear on the focus on 
financial mechanisms and institutional models for PPP. As alluded to above, some of the reports 
in the recommendations went well beyond this framework. Perhaps the contract should specify 
what is not to be addressed. 
Municipal participation 
This is clearly a priority concern for EMS. It may be assumed that as a regional secretariat, the 
members it serves, and who place demands on it, comprise municipalities rather than the research 
centers. Most municipalities have a Department of Technical Cooperation and International 
Relations whose task is primarily to secure grant funding and technical assistance for priority 
projects; a good example is the COVAAP program in Lima. However, EMS is concerned with 
introducing a more knowledge-based approach to environmental policy. This is of obvious 
interest to local governments, but given the day-to-day pressures and political imperatives of a 
resource-short bureaucracy, genuine participation in the research and application of its results by 
senior staff has been less than expected in many cases. Two contract conditions might improve 
this situation - a requirement to hold one or more internal workshops to discuss progress and the 
draft conclusions and recommendations of the study; and a provision whereby grant funds should 
be used for part-time participation of two or three senior municipal staff members in the study 
team. For most municipalities this would be feasible. For example, in the San Fernando case, 
IIED-AL could have contracted municipal staff and, with the benefit of hindsight, would have 
done so. 
Transparency 
In two cases the study reports could not reflect the reality of the PPP model. This would have 
required explicit mention of institutional constraints which the municipality (or the private sector 
actors) may see as prejudicial. It is evident that if a municipal authority feels insecure on the 
issues raised in a study and its ability to address them, it will not put its name on the cover of the 
report. In practice it may view the whole exercise as counterproductive. The question is whether 
anything can be written into the contract which may alert EMS early of this potential constraint 
and offer a platform for dialogue on the issue. 
Report publication 
Under current contracts there is no provision for publication of a report on the research. Research 
centers are encouraged to publish under their own names, giving due credit to EMS'S support. In 
spite of good intentions, there has been little publication and dissemination of results - IIED-AL 
and POLIS are the exceptions. In general, the research centers recognize that the technical 
reports are not publishable as they stand; nor were they intended to be published. Aside from the 
technical report, the contract could require presentation of a summary covering the methodology, 
analysis and conclusions of the PPP model studied. This report would be submitted in draft to 
EMS for comment and approval prior to publication. The question of publication and other 
dissemination activities, appears critical to EMS operations. Timely publication of summary 
reports on completion of the study should offer considerable leverage to the SRG program. For 
example, targeted distribution of such reports may be expected to influence large projects such as: 
the $80 million IDB loan to El Salvador, 80% of which is assigned to solid waste management; 
the $20 million World Bank loan to Peru to carry forward the EEC-funded initiative for micro- 
enterprises in water supply; and replication of models through central government agencies such 
as FONCODES in Peru, or ETOSS - the Argentine authority which regulates private suppliers of 
social services. 
4.3. Pro-active role of EMS 
The Secretariat has been stretched very thin in developing and administering a complex network 
and program of SRGs. The question is whether achievement of its agenda may be enhanced by 
reallocation of resources to provide greater intellectual input into the SRG cycle, follow-up to 
some grants and development of complementary activities which give leverage to the competitive 
grants program. 
Zntellectu&l input 
It is evident from the cases evaluated that both the municipalities and research centers consider 
that $14,000, plus perhaps $5-8,000 in counterpart staff or logistical support expended over 6-12 
months, represents an experiment in introducing new approaches and ideas via research. It is 
expected to set in train a process of change in the way knowledge is generated and used to 
promote PPPs to increase the scope (funding) and efficiency, equity and sustainability outcomes 
of environmental management by municipalities. Accepting the experimental nature of the 
approach, the dollar amount is perhaps not critical; rather, it is the analytical thinking which 
comes with the grant that may make a difference. IDRC is well known for its contribution on the 
latter score. Because of this, it has access to decision-makers in private enterprise, municipal 
government and research entities. Should EMS have a greater presence (personal participation 
and ideas on the agenda) in contract negotiation, implementation (e.g. the transparency issue), 
internal seminars to review research findings or public meetings with wider actor participation to 
discuss such findings? In addition, there is a question of how much quality control EMS should 
apply either to technical reports or draft summaries proposed for publication by contracting 
outside reviewers or editors. 
Follow-up 
The same questions mentioned above on physical presence and intellectual input also apply to 
follow-up. For example, in the cases of TomC, MVMT and San Salvador the research centers 
have entrepreneured grants to enable follow-up. EMS might consider routinely supporting the 
municipalities and centers to promote follow-up e.g. the La Paz and MSBC cases. The issue here 
is the expected benefit of a marginal investment in follow-up given that the alternative of not 
investing in some cases may essentially be to write off the grant. It is evident that EMS cannot 
expect a 100% success rate on its grants. However, the cases reviewed suggest that in some 
instances EMS could catalyze processes which take advantage of evolving situations (see point 
(4.4.). Again, this would require additional EMS inputs to assess such situations. Even in some 
cases where results are not up to expectations, if this were done in association with local actors 
and documented, it could be a valuable adjunct to the knowledge generation and dissemination 
aims of the Secretariat. 
Non-RSG activities 
A key question arising from the seven cases is whether EMS can expect to gain leverage on the 
valuable accumulated SRG experience by investing in activities such as: surveys or special 
studies, travel grants to municipal officials to enable presentation of the case to regional or 
international meetings, convening of workshops attended by representatives of research centers 
and municipalities engaged in the studies (from which a comparative analysis of PPPs might be 
developed), active promotion of publication or expanded linkages with relevant regional and 
national associations such as those already established with Mercociudades. 
4.4. Evaluation 
The question of tradeoffs between EMS resources allocated and achievement of an "optimum," 
fully participatory evaluation, was raised in Section 1. Experience from this evaluation suggests 
that the ex post assessment phase of the SRG cycle could be used as an instrument of follow-up. 
In this event the TOR would specify that the evaluator identify and interview, not only the 
immediate participants in the study, but also actors who have been or are currently working on 
urban environmentlpoverty questions directly related to the topic of the SRG. For example, in 
San Salvador conhcts could have been made with the Friederich Ebert Foundation, UNDP, IDB 
and the Canadian corporation (MIDAS) dealing with solid waste, all of whom have been involved 
with the municipalities and have plans for future studies and investments. A similar situation 
applies to MVMT where key actors of interest to any EMS follow-up include the EEC, World 
Bank, SEDAPAL and the Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental. In all cases contacts related 
to the current and future context of potential change in the indicators of performance discussed in 
Section 3 could be expanded to include corporate entities directly involved, industry associations, 
central government regulatory agencies which impinge on municipal operations, international 
banks, NGOs and foreign technical assistance agencies. With this range of participation, the 
evaluator becomes another "actor" in orienting if and how EMS might proceed with follow-up in 
the specific case or with adjustments in the grant program. Such an approach would significantly 
increase the resources required for evaluation. 
4.5. The SRGIoverhead ratio 
All the operational issues discussed imply a reallocation of limited funds from externally 
managed grants to internally managed operations. One measure of EMS'S efficiency may be 
taken as a high ratio of grants to overhead. Nevertheless, the cases evaluated suggest that cost- 
effectiveness of the RSG component, judged by the achievement of program objectives outlined 
in Section 1, may be improved by selective reallocation of resources. 
5. OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The evaluation raises a number of issues which bear on how IDRC might proceed in the next 
phase of the EMS initiative. Two premises provide a framework for considering options: first, 
IDRC intends the Secretariat to be a permanent entity; and second, it does not plan to provide 
indefinite support. EMS has been in place for six years and executed 40 SRGs for municipalities 
in eight countries. It has developed a broad network of institutional and individual contacts 
throughout the Latin American region. This has been an important learning process in capacity 
building. This evaluation suggests that consolidation of a self-sustaining Secretariat will require 
perseverance by the Center in an institutional context which entails risks. Sections 3 and 4 
provide background from which one might speculate on scenarios of what the Secretariat might 
look like in five to ten years with respect to program scope and nature, clientele serviced, 
organizational structure and sources of funding. From there one might go on to examine what 
steps may be considered by EMS to facilitate a transition towards a more permanent status. One 
option might be to have IDRC use its convening capability in an adaptive process of broadening 
the focus of, and participation in, the EMS to incorporate sectors such as international or regional 
financial and technical assistance institutions, private enterprise associations, local government 
organizations, national public authorities or foundations. This might enable EMS to build 
towards a clearing house function and provision of a forum for discussion and action on common 
interests in strengthening environmental management and associated poverty alleviation activities 
by municipalities. 
It is taken as self-evident that IDRC will retain the underlying thrust of generation, accumulation 
and dissemination of knowledge relevant to environmental management where concern with 
poverty alleviation is of prime importance. Using this approach, a sound track record has been 
established and interest generated - particularly by NGOs and research centers - in municipal 
environmental management. In addition, judging from the seven cases examined, there is an 
enormous range of international institutions that are deeply involved in the environmental 
qualitylpoverty dimensions of local government policy in Latin America. These, plus the 
research centers and municipalities already in the network, constitute the potential clientele of the 
Secretariat over the long run. 
At this stage, there appears to be no reason to consider broadening the scope of the Secretariat to 
include other sectors where Canada is considered to have strong comparative advantage in the 
global scene - e.g. mining and forestry. 
5.1. The SRG program 
The competitive SRG program should be retained as the axis of the Secretariat's operations. This 
clearly offers an opportunity to promote applied research in generation of knowledge on 
innovative experiences and provides legitimacy to the organization in that it enables direct 
dialogue with municipal authorities who constitute the end-users of the knowledge in effecting 
change in policy formulation and implementation. However, the results of this evaluation 
suggest that some redesign of the SRG process be considered. The expectation that the grants 
could generate an autonomous demand by municipalities for the services of research centers to 
undertake policy-relevant studies has proved to be somewhat elusive. The chronic shortage of 
resources, combined with a long history of grants (or subsidies) for all studies, even including 
project feasibility and design, has created a "culture" of concessionary financing which appears to 
be largely beyond the reach of the Secretariat's program as it stands. The issue here hinges on 
opportunities to broaden the institutional base of the Secretariat to include international or 
regional organizations and national private and public entities, including municipal governments. 
This may be expected to lead to redefinition of common interests and expanded funding. 
Another aspect of the program is the relatively low level of municipal participation in the studies 
in some of the cases. Only in two or three instances did senior policy makers take active 
initiatives in conduct of the studies. This situation reduces the likelihood that findings will result 
in policy change or improved efficiency in municipal operations. The following aspects in 
moving the focus more towards conceptualization, typologies and methodologies, and providing 
for greater municipal commitment, warrant examination: 
a. EMS could undertake a survey to identify potentially interesting or innovative cases 
and institutions (NGOs, multi-national corporations such as Lyonnaise des Eaux 
providing urban environmental services, banks, UN agencies, national industry 
associations, etc.) which are at present or will be involved in the evolution of such 
cases. This should enable progressive construction of a typology of cases (and an 
inventory of institutions active in supporting change in urban environmental 
management) which may be used in both design and targeting of bidding documents. 
b. In the cases of research proposals which pass the initial screening, EMS should make 
a systematic effort to establish the institutional context with respect to the record of 
the municipal authority itself in stability and implementation of environmental 
policy; and the other institutions expected to impinge on the study and use of its 
results (e.g. the dynamic context of the MSBC, San Salvador and MVMT cases). 
c. Where the record of the municipality is not encouraging, EMS may still approve the 
grant as an example of a typology and/or to accumulate knowledge on constraints to 
change. In this case, the risks would be explicit and contingencies may be built into 
the research contract. 
d. The research contracts might: 
be for periods of up to one year 
require the municipality and research center to organize internal workshops 
with staff of the relevant departments. As a minimum a workshop should be 
held to discuss the findings of the study prior to drafting the final technical 
report 
= require the municipality to arrange a meeting with other actors involved in 
the study to discuss study findings. The minutes of this meeting should be 
annexed to the technical report 
require the municipality, where this is legally feasible, to use grant funds to 
hire two or three senior staff on a part-time basis to be assigned to the study 
place more emphasis on innovative methodology in research, action-research 
and evaluation of the case 
require the municipality to submit a draft summary report subject to EMS 
approval, which would be published either from the grant or with EMS core 
funds 
e. EMS should provide funds from the core budget to enable a municipal staff member 
to travel to a regional or international meeting to present the case study. 
f. EMS should play a more pro-active role in the grant cycle such as: possibly making 
personal contact with municipal officials prior to grant approval; design of the 
proposal; follow-up on implementation to address possible transparency issues on 
research design and reporting compliance with workshop requirements; or quality 
control of the summary report to be published; ex post evaluation and related follow- 
up to maintain momentum developed in the study, exploit opportunities with other 
donors in the use of research findings or correct shortfalls in performance. 
g. A key aspect of the pro-active role is the development of a full intellectual 
partnership with SRG recipients supported by IDRC's prestige, worldwide network 
of institutional associations and significant convening power. The potential impact of 
the EMS does not derive from the absolute dollar amount of its budget but from 
application of the above characteristics of the Center. This is closely linked to the 
non-RSG activities discussed below. 
5.2. Non-RSG Activities 
Many of the above suggestions on operation of the grant program require funding from EMS' 
core budget - notably points a), e), f) and g). The premise adopted here is that if IDRC is to 
launch an autonomous Secretariat in perhaps three to five years or so, it will be essential to re- 
allocate some resources away from SRGs to the following: 
a. Special studies: The survey suggested in 5.1.a) above would be one of these. The 
studies would be oriented to developing a framework for EMS action through SRGs, 
regional workshops, travel grants, publications and networking. They may include : 
literature reviews on selected topics - both IIED-AL and Prohabitat found a review of 
this nature, and undertaken as part of the grant-funded research, to be highly relevant 
to their own operations; surveys of national or sub-regional experiences; analyses of 
the institutional context within which municipalities are evolving their environmental 
policies and programs; targeted case studies e.g. an evaluation of the EEC's 
COVAAP program in Lima. 
b. Workshops: The EMS grants have accumulated sufficient material to warrant 
holding a regional workshop attended by representatives from selected 
municipalities, research centers and national and international donor agencies or 
NGOs. In addition, some of the special studies could be specifically targeted to 
formulating an agenda for a workshop with donor agencies, research centers and 
private and public sector actors. Both workshops could be seen as the first steps in an 
approach by successive approximation towards the structure, tasks and financing of 
an autonomous EMS. 
c. Publications: If the Secretariat is to develop a stable funding base it probably 
needs to consider establishing more visibility with its potential clientele. The Web is 
an inadequate vehicle for this - even some of the research centers, and none of the 
municipalities in the cases evaluated were aware that their reports were on the Web. 
As implied above, the Secretariat should press for publication of timely and high 
quality summary reports from the 1999 SRG program and require such reports in 
future research contracts with municipalities. In both cases the Secretariat probably 
will have to provide partial or 100% financing from non-grant sources. Ideally these 
would be published under an EMS cover with due recognition of the municipalities, 
research centers and authors. The technical reports as they stand are unsuited to this 
purpose. Thus, it will be necessary to face the prospect of contracting outside 
technical reviewers and editors. Presumably the special studies and workshops would 
also lead to publications. EMS could also develop a systematic approach to getting 
articles based on its grant-funded research into journals or trade magazines. 
Undoubtedly a program of this sort will be costly and tradeoffs in a high or low 
SRGInon-SRG ratio will require assessment. 
d. Networking: The Secretariat has already established working relationships with 
Mercociudades, IDB, UNDP, the World Bank and Habitat. All the research centers 
involved in the cases evaluated would like to retain links for both financial and 
intellectual reasons. Ways might be explored to expand and consolidate these types 
of linkage in conjunction with all of the Secretariat's activities in research, 
workshops and publications. 
5.3. EMS Stability 
The real challenge facing the Secretariat is how to orchestrate the types of activity discussed 
above to establish a stable financial base. The emphasis on "Type 2" partnerships involving 
government, business, local communities and NGOs, provided by the recent world summit in 
Johannesburg should facilitate the search for funds. The current clientele of EMS comprises 
research centers and municipalities. From the cases evaluated one may conclude that no funding 
can be expected from this set of actors. Networking with national or regional organizations in 
research, municipal government or community development will clearly increase the Secretariat's 
legitimacy but will not result in significant sustained financial support. Thus, the only source of 
permanent funding is the set of relatively large national and international suppliers of technical 
assistance and grants or loans in support of municipal authorities, such as those mentioned in 
Annexes C to I. Several of these cases offer an opportunity to explore operational links between 
EMS and these "suppliers" through funding follow-up actions. However, as already mentioned, it 
appears that the only approach is via successive approximation using the range of SRG and non- 
SRG options open to the Secretariat. These approximations should lead to definition of aspects 
such as : the nature of the governing body, organization of the Secretariat, critical mass (budget) 
and priority activities. One thing seems clear from the foregoing analysis - the Secretariat needs 
to strengthen its non-SRG activities. 
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX A - TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION 
EMS' EVALUATION - TERMS OF REFERENCE 
Purpose of the Evaluation 
- Provide IDRC with an assessment of the core EMS' activities, mainly of the most recent 
phase of the competitive small research grant program (SRG) , carried out between 
Avgust 1999 slnd Apr;.! 2nn2; 
- Analyze the implications of this assessment for future programming, in particular to 
examine the market for the Secretariat's services and explore options for consolidating 
the process through more effective participation of local governments and broadening the 
funding base to include other entities with parallel or complementary interests. 
Name of the Consultant: 
Dr. Michael Nelson 
Consultant Economist - Natural Resources and Environment 
Carlos Ossandon 1682 
Casa "D" - La Reina 
Santiago de Chile 
Chile 
Tel: (562) 273 - 3106 / Celular: 09 99 47 787 
Fax: (56-2) 273 - 7077 
mnelson @entelchile.net 
Use / Users of the Evaluation 
The results will be used as part of the proposal for the Request for Additional Funding for the 
next phase of the Secretariat. 
The results will be submitted to EMSADRC, who in turn will present the document to the 
members of the Advisory Committee, and to potential external donors. 
This Evaluation must include the following aspects: 
a) Programme design: 
To evaluate the design of the Competitive Grant Programme in terms of its contribution 
to meet the objectives of EMS, in particular with reference to the following: 
a. 1) Efficiency and transparency of the process in the following phases: 
i) preparation of the call; 
ii) dissemination and circulation of call; 
iii) selection of proposals and evaluation of phases. 
a.2) Interest in the issue. 
a.3) Quality of findings. 
b) Programme implementation 
To evaluate whether the Competitive Grant Programme is being implemented as planned. 
c) Programme results: 
c. 1) To determine the effects of the Competitive Grant Programme on municipal policy- 
makers, in terms of medium and long-term goals and repercussions in terms of 
final results. 
c.2) To determine whether the institutional capacity of beneficiaries has been enhanced. 
c ?) Tn d ~ t ~ r m i n ~  whpthpr partnerships with n t h ~ r  institlitinns have h e ~ n  fnstered. 
c.4) To determine whether gender-equity issues were encouraged. 
d) Evaluation of organization. 
To evaluate the Competitive Grant Programme as a whole in order to determine whether 
the programme design, implementation and evaluation respond to priority interests of the 
EMS mission and coincide with its strategic initiatives. 
e) To visit a sample of 7 (seven) completed Competitive Grant Programme projects in Latin 
America and the Caribbean: Salto (Uruguay), San Fernando (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 
La Paz (Bolivia), San Salvador (El Salvador), Villa El Salvador and Villa Maria del 
Triunfo (Peru), Sao Bernardo (Sao Paulo, Brazil), Tom6 (Chile). 
f )  To interview the beneficiary institutions of the Competitive Grant Programme and, in 
particular, the leaders of beneficiary groups. 
g) Advise on the improvements that could be made in terms of the design, implementation, 
control and dissemination of the results, of the Competitive Grant Programme. 
h) To present a final, detailed and satisfactory report on the activities conducted during this 
consultancy, in electronic format (via e-mail), including results of the evaluation. This 
report must be submitted by September 10, 2002, at the latest. 
Work Plan 
This assignment requires the accomplishment of the following phases: 
Review of background material (please refer to section 2 - SRG Program Procedures) 
Discussions with EMS staff: interviews with involved team in LACRO office 
Interview of grant recipients (field visits for discussion with various actors engaged in the 
research and with those expected to be users of the research findings, please refer to 
Annex J) 
Submission of a technical report. 
- 
ANNEX B - CHRONOGRAM OF STEPS IN GRANT PROCESSING 
* No draft report submitted 
** Final disbursement made prior to receipt of final technical report 
Steps in Grant Processing 
From bidding document (3 11811 998) 
to receipt of proposal 
to request for detailed proposal 
to receipt of detailed proposal 
to approval of proposal 
I to signed contract 
to first disbursement 
to receipt of draft report 
to dispatch of comments 
to receipt of final report 
to approval of final report 
o final disbursement 
Study time : to draft report 
: to final report 
























































































































ANNEX C - MANAGEMENT OF SOLID WASTE IN THE COTAHUMA 
DISTRICT : LA PAZ MUNICIPALITY, BOLIVIA 
Contract Procedures and Compliance 
The detailed proposal for this study was submitted by Prohabitat, under the auspices of the 
Institute for Planning and Research (IPR), a semi-autonomous unit in the La Paz Municipality, on 
22/1/2000. It was approved by on 9/3/2000. Due to bureaucratic constraints within the 
municipality which could have delayed implementation of the grant for years, it was decided that 
EMS v;ould coztrac: directly with ,?ichd~it3t. Prcvisicr, .:as r ~ d e  for participstion of the 
municipality under a side agreement with the prime contractor. 
The study became operational on October 11, 2000, with EMS'S first disbursement. During the 
eight-month period of negotiation of the contract, the mayor of La Paz was replaced. The new 
mayor disbanded the IPR. The project director made a presentation of the proposal to this new 
mayor who subsequently appointed her as director of the Environment Department, a post she 
resigned (because of coalition politics) about the time the study became operational. She 
approached the new director of the Environment Department, as the logical counterpart for the 
study, but cooperation was refused. Later she established a counterpart arrangement with a new 
office charged with setting up a semi-autonomous entity within the municipal structure to 
regulate contracts with private or public enterprises - Sistema de Regulaci6n Municipal 
(SEREMU). This director was subsequently discharged, but was able to sign the letter 
approving the study on behalf of the municipality three days prior to his departure. 
The draft report was submitted to EMS on November 12, 2001 and the final report in February, 
2002 i.e. an implementation period of 16 months. Final payment was made to Prohabitat on 
September 3, 200 1. Prohabitat is still holding reserve funds for preparation, publication, 
presentation and distribution of a "glossy cover" summary report. It is hoped that action on this 
component of the contract can be taken by October 2002. 
Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
The instability of the municipal counterpart efforts is evident from the foregoing discussion of 
contract implementation. During much of the 1990s the turnover of mayors in La Paz was one 
every year or two. Each new mayor arrived with his own agenda, which, by definition, could 
inherit nothing from his predecessor. Contributing to the general state of uncertainty was the 
1999 decree by the central government prohibiting municipalities to borrow, given the parlous 
state of their finances. This decree is expected to remain in effect until 2005. Under the 
circumstances, staff see themselves as "firemen" with little incentive to show tangible results, 
take a long-term view, or learn from past experience. There appears to be no institutional 
memory. One may conclude that the project was negotiated, carried out and the report submitted 
in an on-going environment of disarray within the Municipality. 
The Report 
The first line of the document implies that the EMS-funded study is seen as a direct follow-up to 
the case study in the Cotahuma district funded by the Swiss government and carried out by 
Prohabitat in 2000, with the final report published in April 2002.' Perhaps because of this follow- 
up approach a great deal is left unsaid in the document presented to EMS. The chapter on 
theoretical context is excellent. However, the discussion of methodology and hypotheses is 
confusing. In the EPFL document Prohabitat presents an excellent annex on methodology which 
is equally relevant to the second report. The case study chapter in the EMS-supported study 
presents data on the district which is largely irrelevant to solid waste management, as well as data 
which is relevant, but at the La Paz municipal level. The presentation appears to rest largely on 
interviews with 17 employees of micro-enterprises engaged in solid waste collection. The 
contradictory responses from such a limited sample preclude any conclusion except perhaps that 
there is need for training and environmental education - which probably could have been drawn a 
priori. As in the instance of methodology. Prohabitat presents an excellent assessment based on 
extensive surveys and interviews in the district in the EPFL document, which is relevant to the 
second report. The final chapter on policy which recommends three lines of strategy and 18 
specific actions, appears to be disconnected from the rest of the document. Again, in the EPFL 
report the conclusions and recommendations flow from the diagnosis and analysis. 
In fact, both reports focus on solid waste management in the La Paz Municipality, using the 
Cotahuma case to illustrate the issues in play. However, a notable difference between the two is 
on the treatment of institutional constraints. Since the second report carries the name 
"Municipality of La Paz" on the cover as co-author, it may not be politically expedient to be as 
transparent on unethical procedures and mismanagement as that presented in the first report. In 
the second report, one has to read between the lines to discern that the contract with CLIMA 
SKY, an Argentine company, to handle 70% of the municipality's solid waste, has been grossly 
mismanaged. The municipality was simply incapable of formulating a viable contract and 
supervising its implementation. The corporate managers were more effective at the negotiating 
table. The contract to a private consulting firm to supervise the CLIMA contract went badly 
astray and was canceled when a new mayor took office. A municipal entity was then charged 
with supervision but was subsequently disbanded. In effect, CLIMA now has no supervision and 
is reporting significantly higher tonnages chargeable under its contract. It is buying garbage from 
micro-enterprises at $22lton (the municipal contract price with these enterprises) and "selling" it 
at the price it has negotiated - $48/ton. The company has also invaded some of the territory 
handled by the micro-enterprises. Since so much of the solid waste is handled by CLIMA, in the 
absence of any effective management by the municipality, the latter is virtually hostage in any 
proposed contract re-negotiation. On the surface there would appear to be some key lessons to be 
learned on public-private partnerships from this experience. 
The document prepared for EMS clearly goes further than the first report on policy and actions 
for management of solid waste. The recommendations are logical (even if they do not flow from 
the analysis) but there is no discussion of priorities, sequence of actions, opportunities and 
constraints in implementation and the financial implications for the municipality of taking action. 
Presentation of these operational aspects would clearly have benefited had it had been possible to 
have a workshop with relevant decision-makers in the municipality to review pages 37-45 of the 
draft report. It is to be hoped that in preparing the final publication the two reports can be fused 
and include discussions with SIREMU staff. 
1 
"Innovaciones Tecnolbgicas, Medio Urbano y Disparidades Sociales en AmCrica Latina", 
Laboratorio de Sociologia Urbana, Escuela Polittcnica Federal de Lausanne (EPFL), Suiza, avril2002. 
Municipal Participation in the Project Cycle 
The proposal was designed by Prohabitat and discussed with IPR in the municipality. IPR made 
no substantive input before it was disbanded by the in-coming mayor (see Section 1). Strong 
support for the study was provided by the director of the office to establish SIREMU, and he 
agreed to having two of his consultants work half-time for that office and half-time under contract 
to Prohabitat. In absence of any strong commitment to the study from the upper echelons of the 
municipal administration (c.f. San Salvador and MVMT) and a legal constraint on contracting 
staff on a part-time basis, this arrangement provided Prohabitat with an invaluable physical 
presence in, and good access to, the municipal system However, aside from the director of the 
office to set up STREMTJ. no regular municipality staff was involved. The study was seen as a 
"project" of that director. So, with his departure, and the simultaneous departure of his two 
consultants, the report became an "orphan" within the system. As a result Prohabitat did not see 
an opportunity to discuss the study findings in an inter-departmental internal workshop or make a 
formal presentation to the mayor. During and after the study all contact with municipal staff was 
restricted to individual interviews, although staff did participate in some of the workshops held 
with the micro-enterprises. Apart from the three people involved the possibility is slim that any 
staff member seriously read the report until August 2002 -nine months after its submission. 
The study director circulated a copy of the report to the interim office of SIREMU (created in 
February 2002, but still awaiting passage of the regulation which formally establishes it as an 
operating entity) preparatory to asking for an interview to discuss the EMS evaluation. In spite of 
the relevance of the report no-one in the municipality had seen fit to give a copy to the new 
SIREMU director. He has recognized its relevance to future regulatory operations with which his 
office will be charged. Thus, although one may conclude that there has been virtually no 
participation (sustainable or otherwise) by the municipality in the project cycle to date, there are 
encouraging signs of participation in the unfinished phase of the cycle - presentation of the 
summary report to the mayor and/or the municipal council. 
Impact 
Capacity bugding in the Municipality: Over the past 10-15 years major efforts have been made 
to strengthen Bolivian municipalities without significant results. Consistent with this history, it is 
evident from the foregoing that the institutional context has not been conducive to impact by the 
report itself or the study process on the analytical or managerial capability of municipal staff. As 
stated in Section 4, the hope now is that in the completion of the final step of the project there 
will be impact in SIREMU. 
Capacity building in the research center: In 2001 Prohabitat moved its Bolivian headquarters 
from La Paz to Cochabamba, with a view to concentrating on its vinchuca control and housing 
program. It appears to be down-playing its earlier action-research activities. Under these 
circumstances it se likely that the impact on the research capacity of Prohabitat will be minimal, 
i.e. there are benefits to individuals involved, but not to the institution. 
Municipal policy formulation and implementation: Given the history discussed above, the 
prospects for the study to have much impact on policy are not encouraging. It would appear that 
for some decades Bolivia has always been seen by politicians and technocrats alike to be on the 
verge of a breakthrough. The situation is no different now - a new progressive government was 
installed on August 7, 2002 - a new Ministry of Municipal Development will be part of the in- 
coming government structure - the UNDP is considering funding to create a quasi-public entity 
which will in effect be a "memory" for experience, reports, studies, etc., for all municipalities, 
and which will transfer this memory among municipalities through training and information 
systems - SIREMU will be created as a strictly technical (non-political) autonomous regulatory 
body within the La Paz Municipality. All of these changes may be seen as adding up to an 
opportunity for the EMS grant to have an impact. Speculation on this potential impact hinges on 
the options for follow-up discussed in Section 6. 
Unfinished Business (Follow-up) to Improve Probability of Impact 
The La Paz case poses a major challenge to EMS with respect to whether to consider follow-up 
and if so, at what level. Prohabitat intends to publish the summary report and present it to the La 
Paz Municipal council. As a minimum. EMS should press for this as a final step in the project 
cycle. Beyond that, the study director, not Prohabitat, expects to develop a proposal (hopefully 
with SIREMU) to fund follow-up for implementation of a limited number of the tactical avenues 
proposed in the report. The basic premise is that the municipality is unlikely to take any steps 
towards change unless the mayor sees significant financial resources mobilized e.g. $50-100,000. 
The EMS approach is software-oriented, low visibility and long-term - characteristics which are 
the antithesis of what interests politicians. The words used in the report - cooperation, 
coordination, integration, participation, social capital - are part of the accepted rhetoric but are 
probably not going to cut much ice with the politicians unless they see association with a visible 
(financial) project. Having highlighted the political constraints, there can be no doubt that the 
authorities see real value in being associated with Canada's technical support and a-political 
stance. This raises a question of the costs and benefits of EMS playing a more pro-active role in 
the small-grant process (see Section 7). 
The above approach rests on the entrepreneurial initiative of the study director. No initiative can 
be expected from the municipality. But there is definite support in SIREMU to the idea. The 
question is - should EMS have any interest in taking a pro-active role? 
The first step in such a role would be to press for a high quality summary report which could be 
expected to have credibility with the municipal council. A second step would be to contact 
SIREMU on its interest in follow-up. At present SIREMU sees association with a Canadian 
agency such as IDRC as being highly advantageous in lobbying for approval of the regulation 
which would enable it to become operational. Depending on the reaction of SIREMU, a third 
step would be to have a representative of EMS attend a ProhabitatISIREMU presentation of the 
final report to the municipal council (preferably before the end of October 2002). The 
representative would give an over-view of EMS's regional experience and an evaluation of the La 
Paz study. A fourth step would be to press for, and possibly provide funds for, a broader meeting 
of actors to discuss the report's recommendations and follow-up. EMS's association with such a 
meeting, as a disinterested but prestigious party, would be seen as critical in bringing together a 
number of interest groups who are in sharp conflict over solid waste management - CLIMA 
SKY, the municipality, micro-enterprises, community organizations and private entities 
generating large volumes of solid waste. A fifth step would be EMS's lending its name to a 
proposal to generate funds for a project which may go beyond La Paz to address questions of 
public-private partnerships for solid waste, water supply or sewerage in other municipalities. A 
Canadian group, operating through the embassy in La Paz which has been dealing with conflict 
resolution in municipal operations, may be a potential partner for such an exercise. One may 
even consider an association with the newly created Ministry of Municipal Development. 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) Project selection: This issue is discussed in the San Salvador evaluation (Annex H). The La 
Paz case is reality - a messy reality. Should EMS avoid such situations? If so, how? If not, is 
there anything unique which should be built into grant proposals where institutional constraints 
can be foreseen? Having got into such situations, should EMS see it as an opportunity to 
examine and document seemingly intractable problems in environmental management at the 
municipal level? 
(ii) Quality control of the publications: GMS clearly needs good quality reports which respond 
to operational concerns of managers in municipalities in order to establish credibility. The issue 
is how pro-active can EMS be with respect to content and analysis in reports, especially where 
there are politically sensitive issues in current municipal management? 
(iii) Terms of reference: EMS's background documents put considerable emphasis on aspects 
such as financial and institutional constraints, the need for workshops and public meetings and 
publications. Should the TORS be more explicit on these aspects? 
(iv) Municipal involvement: Under Bolivian law it is illegal for a civil servant to take payment 
for outside work. Thus, the option of sub-contracting municipal staff out of grant funds (e.g. as in 
Argentina, Annex F) does not exist. Are innovative funding arrangements available? In addition, 
if a municipality a priori is determined to be administratively incapable of handling a grant (c.f. 
Annex D), should this be addressed in project design? 
(v)  EMS's concern with evolving a market for research: This case suggests there is a long way 
to go before this becomes a reality in Bolivia. Are complementary activities required? 
(vi) EMS's pro-active role? An unanswered question in this evaluation is whether greater EMS 
involvement could have changed the course of events. The financial costs to EMS are painfully 
evident; the unknown is the potential benefit. 
ANNEX D - AGREEMENTS AMONG COMMUNITY COMMITTEES, THE 
MUNICIPALITY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FOR LOW INCOME URBAN 
AREAS MUNICIPALITY OF SALTO, URUGUAY. 
Contractual Procedures and Compliance 
The proposal was prepared by the Institute for Social Development (IDES) and the Department of 
Economics of the University of the Republic on the basis of discussions with the Municipality on 
-:;here it saw rcsexcb zodd bc uszfa! to its po!icics &ad programs in cirvironmcnt applicable to 
poor communities. The proposal submitted by the Municipality was approved by EMS on 
9./3/2000. The study became operational on 18/8/2000 with the first disbursement under the 
grant. The final report was submitted by the Municipality on 27/8/2000 and was approved by 
EMS with disbursement of the 25% balance owed on the grant on 9/3/2000. Thus, from EMS'S 
viewpoint there was compliance with the contract, with a six-month delay. However, a question 
arises in this case as to whether EMS could or should play a role with respect to procedures in 
implementing the sub-contract (annexed to the EMS~Municipality contract) between the 
Municipality and IDES. The Municipality made no payment to IDES until several months after 
the study had been initiated and, as of August 2002 (ten months after final disbursement by 
EMS), the final 10% owing on the contract had still not been paid. 
The Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
At the outset (design and initiation of the study) there was considerable interest in the 
Municipality at the level of the mayor and three department directors (social services, 
environment and public works). The Municipality had made a significant investment in 1987 in 
channeling, drainage and flood control of the Sauzal ravine. The four low-income communities 
adjacent to the ravine were selected as the focus of the study. It was seen as a useful mechanism 
for engaging the community committees in a participatory evaluation of the investment and in 
identifying opportunities for joint action with these committees and the private sector to address 
environmental problems - water quality, flooding, solid waste and related health issues. 
A manifestation of this interest was the role that the Municipality chose to play in the first 
meeting of the communities convened to explain the objectives, methodology and scope of the 
study. Seeing an opportunity to make a positive political impact, the authorities transmitted the 
message that the study was to be carried out by the Municipality. Because of long-standing 
antagonism by the communities towards the local government, this approach proved counter- 
productive. IDES had to re-start the process of getting local participation in the study through 
meetings not attended by municipal officials. 
Another aspect of the institutional context was the conflict between the Municipality and the state 
water and sewage company (OSE) whose mandate included the Sauzal ravine. On occasion the 
communities would by-pass the Municipality, and take their problems with water quality and 
flooding directly to OSE in Montevideo. At the same time OSE was seen by the municipal 
authority to be ineffectual in supplying and maintaining water and sewage to the city. For these 
reasons OSE was not incorporated in the study. In addition, the Municipality was not anxious to 
confront the industries which were contaminating the Sauzal ravine and as a result there was little 
meaningful private sector involvement in the study. In spite of the use of "private enterprise" in 
the title of the study, one hardly needs to read between the lines to discern that association at the 
corporate level was essentially an intractable issue. 
As the study progressed there appeared to be little interest in using it as a vehicle to help resolve 
these conflicts. Consequently, the content of the report (see Section 3) and the opportunity to 
generate constructive participation and dialogue among the key actors on environmental 
management mentioned above, were seriously constrained by the institutional context. Even with 
a "sanitized" report, the view of IDES is that the Municipality would be against any public 
meeting or multi-sector seminar to discuss the study unless it was completed "controlled". 
Aside from external discussion of the study, the internal institutional arrangements of the 
Municipality precluded any interaction on the issues among staff. The report was discussed 
separately with the directors of the three departments directly involved in the Sauzal ravine case. 
It was never discussed jointly among them or in any internal seminar. 
The Report 
The bulk of the report (80%) deals with the methodology on consultation, mainly with the four 
communities, and presentation of findings and results of questionnaire surveys - both of which 
appear particularly inconclusive with respect to the stated objectives of the study.2 As a result, 
the recommendations on "institutional space" for environmental management, environmental 
education, mass diffusion of information via the media, coordination, etc., seem to bear little 
relationship to the data presented. Since there are no clear hypotheses specified for the study as a 
basis for the collection of the descriptive material presented there is essentially no framework for 
analysis on which to base conclusions and recommendations. 
IDES had considerable information on the results of past agreements between the community 
committees and the Municipality, and on the opportunities and constraints to participation by 
other actors in the public and private sectors. However, since the report would go out under the 
name of the Municipality, any formal presentation of such information was seen as being 
counterproductive. It would merely have created conflict in the conduct of the study and 
prejudiced acceptance of recommendations. 
Municipal Participation in the Project Cycle 
As indicated in Section 2, there was participation by the mayor and staff in the initial stages of the 
study. The three department directors provided ideas throughout and reviewed the final draft of 
the report. The mayor participated in the formal ceremony for presentation of the report. It may 
be concluded from the assessment in Section 3 that there was minimal staff exposure to the study 
process, apart from the four mentioned above. 
Impact 
(i) Capacity building in the Municipality: If the evaluation of the institutional context (Section 
2) and the Municipal participation (Section 4) are accepted, the conclusion must be that capacity 
building attributable to the study was negligible. 
2 Objective: identification of activities designed to optimize implementation of public-private 
mechanisms for management of new projects to improve environmental quality. 
(ii) Capacity building in the research center: The experience of working within the political 
realities of municipal decision-making and dealing with insecure bureaucrats will undoubtedly 
improve the analytical capacity of those in the two research centers associated with the study. 
(iii) Municipalpolicy: In the 12 months which have elapsed since presentation of the report there 
has been no sign of interest in, or questioning of, the findings. Assuming no further contact with 
the Municipality on the topic of the research, the probability that the study process and report will 
lead to change of policy in public-private partnership in environmental management looks 
extremely low. 
Unfinished Business - Follow-up to Improve Probability of Impact 
Although the prospects of potential impact from this grant appear dismal as things stand now, it is 
by no means clear that further effort by EMS will either help remove the institutional constraints 
or improve the quality of the report. EMS could propose funding a seminar with the key interest 
groups based on an agenda derived from what IDES knows about the issues rather than its written 
report. From the discussion in Section 2 it would appear unlikely that the Municipality would 
approve such a proposal. If it did, it is to be expected that any options for follow-up would be 
derived from the seminar discussion. 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) Transparency: A key question which would seem highly relevant to EMS policy is how to 
proceed once a research center has discerned that a municipality, as "owner" of the study, is 
implicitly unwilling to be transparent on basic questions which underlie the design and conduct of 
the researcwaction-researchlfacilitation process addressing the topic specified in the contract? If 
there were a method of identifying this potential risk at the stage of project selection one could 
propose that it be a criterion for disqualification. However, in practice there is absolutely no way 
one could foresee such a risk in a proposal which comes with the full endorsement of the 
municipality. Accordingly, with the benefit of hindsight, what options could have been available 
to EMS, in the Salto Municipality case, to avert or reduce the extent of a negative outcome? 
Could a contingency clause be built into the contract requiring the sub-contractor to advise the 
Municipality, with copy to EMS, where it considered that lack of transparency, withholding of 
data or unwillingness to allow internal workshops or external inter-actor meetings, were likely to 
compromise the usefulness of the study? Such a clause would have been acceptable to most, if 
not all, of the seven municipalities covered by this evaluation. If acted upon by a research center 
it would allow EMS to call a mid-course meeting to review the situation. The corollary is that 
EMS may well be faced with the prospect of mid-course cancellation of a contract. A less 
abrasive procedure would be routine discussion of this potential issue with the research center 
prior to study initiation and two months after implementation with a view to EMS'S making an 
informal approach to the municipality if necessary. An even less abrasive procedure would be 
that EMS accept that a percentage of grants will run into this problem. In these cases they would 
be classified as "inconclusive" and no follow-up would be contemplated. 
(ii) Follow-up: In contrast to the foregoing premise that in this case the institutional context 
constitutes a "problem", EMS could take the position that exposure to this reality poses a 
challenge and offers an opportunity to play a pro-active role. IDRC could use its international 
prestige to open doors to key decision-makers and present ideas - an option frequently not 
available to the research center. The agenda in this case would be to define a follow-up program 
with IDES or other entities aimed at reaching operational proposals likely to be acceptable to the 
municipal authorities; the expectation being that such a program would be funded through 
sources other than EMS. 
(iii) Quality control on the final report: Section 5 may be unduly hard on the document, 
particularly in view of what material and analysis IDES saw it could not present for political 
reasons. However, again with the benefit of hindsight, the report should not have been put on the 
web. Unless there is a seminar along the lines suggested in Section 6, there would appear to be 
no way the report could be salvaged. Publication as it stands, with EMS's implicit or explicit 
approval, would detract from EMS's credibility with its municipal and research center associates. 
The general question is whether EMS has the resources, or should have the resources, to monitor 
study progress, review draft reports or contract reviewers and editors? 
A procedural question arising is whether EMS should include a clause in the contract requiring 
the municipality to submit a draft for comment by EMS prior to presentation of the final report. 
The commenting "process" would provide the Secretariat a point of entry for dialogue with both 
the Municipality and research center along the lines suggested in (i) and (ii) above. 
ANNEX E - OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACTS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN THE "RESIDUAL SOLIDS AND CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION PROJECT": MUNICIPALITY OF SAO 
BERNARD0 DO CAMP0 SAO PAULO, BRAZIL 
Contract Procedures and Compliance 
The detailed study proposal was submitted by the Municipality of Sio Bernardo do Campo 
(MSBC) on 27/11 2000 and approved by EMS on 9/3/2000. The study was to be implemented 
under an agreement between the POLIS Institute and MSBC as a follow-up to the 
POLIS,KXICEF prcject (Dzccnbcr I335 to h n c  2000) in suppc~rt of the a~zicipality's 
"Residual Solids and Citizen Participation (RSCP) Project". The study became operational in 
July 2000, two months prior to EMS'S first disbursement to MSBC under the grant. 
The report was largely drafted by POLIS in consultation with the Secretariat of Environment in 
MSBC. It was subsequently reviewed internally by the Executive Working Group (EWG), 
created by the mayor in 1997 to coordinate the RSCP project, and officially submitted to EMS on 
27/11 2002 i.e. an implementation period of 17 months. The report was approved by EMS and 
final disbursement to MSBC was made on 4/3/2002. 
Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
The municipal government context exhibits a high degree of stability. The mayor is in his third 
term, 10 years plus, and is strongly committed to the RSCP project. The EWG comprises 
representatives from the 12 secretariats in the municipality at the level of director or senior 
professional i.e. the first or second tier below the Secretary. This group met regularly throughout 
the study and continues to meet monthly or semi-monthly. The size of the municipality (700,000 
population) and its tax base (e.g. a significant fraction of Brazil's automobile industry is located 
within its boundaries) provide the basis for high quality professionalism and continuity among 
staff. In addition, there was strong commitment from the Secretariat for Environment - the 
counterpart - to the study. 
Aside from the Municipality, an array of unusually strong NGO and private sector associations 
was mobilized by the study. The POLIS Institute itself is widely recognized for its capacity in 
research, action-research, training, etc, and the fact that it is backed by 80 important organizations 
gives it strong leverage in convening meetings and securing participation of relevant actors. 
Among the more important of these actors were: the association of Brazilian NGOs - the 
ABRINQ Foundation - with comprehensive capability in research and policy analysis, as well as 
lobbying for the interests of a very large number of NGOs throughout the country; the Ethos 
Institute, an autonomous organization (funded by 600 commercial and industrial entities) charged 
with research, dialogue and dissemination of ideas on "social responsibility of private enterprise"; 
and the Industry Association for the State of Siio Paulo (CIESP) which is one of the most 
powerful private sector groups in the country. 
In spite of this favorable context, some aspects of the internal institutional arrangements 
governing MSBC operations appear with the benefit of hindsight to have constrained 
performance. On the surface the EWG looks like the optimum vehicle for focusing, coordinating 
and adapting municipal policy on technical, social and financial dimensions of residual solids 
management. However, as the Secretaries themselves were not actively involved there was a 
problem of coordination due to hierarchy - the coordinator of the study was at the director level 
and was unable to mobilize adequate commitment from the key Secretariat in an exercise 
specifically aimed at bringing private enterprise into partnership with the municipal government - 
notably the Secretariat for Development. Because of this, an important opportunity was lost to 
involve the ClESP at a level where it would be expected to bring to the negotiating table a policy 
position on the private sector's role in various dimensions of the RSCP project and place the 
MSBC in a position where it had to make proposals for partnership taking this policy into 
account. In consequence, the private sector tended to be seen as a passive partner expected to 
provide logistical and financial support, rather than as an active associate capable of contributing 
ideas, management expertise, etc. to the program. One might conclude that the hierarchical 
institutional "rules" precluded either POLIS or the MSBC counterpart from getting a more 
operational public-private sector dialogue, with active NGO participation, on policy and policy 
implementation in the area covered by the RSCP project. This might have been regarded as a true 
"partnership" approach. 
The Report 
The text provides an extensive discussion of the MSBC's RSCP project, with particular emphasis 
on the program supported by UNICEF and POLIS over the 18-month period December 1998 to 
June 2000 which provided the basis for the EMS-supported study. It documents an extensive 
process of collaboration between several MSBC Secretariats and a wide range of state agencies, 
private corporate entities, national and international NGOs, labor unions and universities, in 
strategic planning for an action program covering 18 sub-programs in various aspects of 
management of solid waste as well as adult education, schooling at all levels, public health, 
housing and retraining. 
The balance of the report provides a detailed assessment of the process of agenda-setting, 
dialogue, meetings, etc. aimed at agreements for private sector participation in MSBC's RSCP 
project with NGO support. What does not come through clearly is the enormous effort that was 
put into this exercise by all the actors, particularly POLIS and MSBC. Both the level of effort 
and the intellectual input required, in what must be regarded as a favorable institutional context 
(see Section 2), appear highly relevant to the question of promoting public-private partnerships 
for environmental management at the municipal level. Also, to a reader unfamiliar with the State 
of S5o Paulo and MSBC, the importance of the negotiation process described is largely lost 
because of the extensive use of acronyms without description. A footnote describing the size, 
aims and capabilities of these institutions would rectify this situation. 
Municipal Participation in the Project Cycle 
As indicated in Sections 1 and 2, POLIS visualized the EMS 1990 small grant program as an 
opportunity to follow up on the UNICEFPOLIS exercise in support of the MSBC's RSCP 
project. Thus, solid backing from the municipality was already in place in the form of the EWG. 
The group was convened five times in the course of the study with participation of around 20 
senior staff members in each meeting and is continuing to meet on a regular basis. This, 
combined with the active role of the Secretariat for Environment (as POLIS counterpart) on- 
going interest by the mayor and the intent of MSBC to publish a book with POLIS on the overall 
RSCP project before the end of 2002, is judged as a significant level of participation. 
Impact 
Capacity building in the Municipality: The level of participation by senior staff, discussed in 
Section 4, clearly has increased capacity to address innovative aspects of involving the private 
and NGO sectors in municipal programs and policies 
Capacity building in the Research Center: The study provided the research center with an 
opportunity to review the literature and apply methodology specifically to promote private sector 
engagement in an NGO-public sector program in which it had already been involved for two 
years. In the process the center was actively associated with other research centers, such as Ethos 
and the ABRINQ Foundation, on the conceptual issues in the private sector's social 
responsibilities, as well as opportunities and constraints in public policy for environmental 
management. The experience has clearly enriched the center's capability and has led to several 
publications as well as papers presented to professional meetings. 
Municipal policy formulation and implementation: In contrast with the other six cases covered 
by this evaluation, the MSBC/POLIS study is more ambitious in that it attempts to promote and 
assess private partnership in municipal policy or programs at the sector level rather than via the 
vehicle of micro-enterprises or the contracting of public services to private corporations. A 
concrete impact mentioned in the report's conclusions is agreement by 13 small and medium 
enterprises to deliver their solid waste to the municipality's two recycling centers. This has led to 
a 20% increase in incomes of those in the micro-enterprises associated with these centers. 
However, the main impact should derive from the seminar held in October 2001 attended by 
representatives from 15 enterprises, MSBC (including the mayor), key research centers and 
NGOs and IDRC. The expectation is that the seminar and other "outputs" of the study process 
will alter the perceptions of decision-makers in public and private sectors alike. The move would 
be away from the traditional view that the former should expect assistance (primarily financial) 
from the latter to carry out its predetermined agenda, towards a recognition by the private sector 
of its social responsibilities and creation of a solid basis for a constructive public-private 
partnership in the provision of social services. A further impact which may be attributed to the 
study is that a research center can establish itself as a "legitimate" intermediary, characterized by 
objectivity and innovative ideas, in facilitating dialogue on policy and operational issues between 
two sectors which are frequently seen to be in conflict. It is to be expected that both the above 
impacts will be improved if the municipality itself can come to grips with the institutional 
constraints to coordination and adoption of a more entrepreneurial approach discussed in Section 
0 
Unfinished Business - Follow-up to Improve Probability of Impact 
For reasons of everyday pressure of work and the institutional constraints discussed in Sections 2 
and 5, the municipality has not demonstrated dynamic follow-up over the six months since the 
study was completed. Some private enterprises are delivering solid waste to recycling centers. 
But this was not the main thrust of the exercise. No serious action has been taken to get 
meaningful involvement of CIESP in the environmental and social policy of MSBC. No need has 
been seen to involve POLIS or other research and NGO entities associated with the study in this 
process either through contractual arrangements or additional workshops. Also initiative for 
publication of a report (or book) on the RSCP project experience rests with the municipality. 
Lack of funds is cited as a reason for inaction; in an organization with the resources of MSBC, 
this situation might be better explained in terms of priorities. 
Thus, as in the case of most of the studies, EMS is faced with the question of whether to invest 
additional time and money in order to move the outcome to a more tangible operational level. A 
strong reason for considering such a move is to capitalize on a highly innovative approach to 
getting private financial, intellectual and entrepreneurial involvement at the sector level. In 
addition, this approach has been tested in a context characterized by what must be one of the most 
dynamic and capable set of actors (public, private, NGOs, research centers) in Latin America. As 
an approach, EMS could take the initiative with the mayor of MSBC to hold a workshop with a 
limited number of selected representatives from the municipality, POLIS, CIESP, Ethos and 
ABRINQ. This would probably require presentation of EMS's views and participation in 
meetings with the mayor and in the follow-up workshop. The purpose would be to remedy the 
shortfall in the process discussed in Section 2, and move towards a more systematic process 
whereby the private sector would participate in setting the RSCP agenda and not merely be seen 
as a contributor to a personal project of the mayor. 
Since publication of a report from the study was not part of the contract with MSBC, EMS has no 
leverage on this product. Leverage could be obtained by providing funds, perhaps with the 
condition that POLIS and Ethos participate to ensure full presentation of the lessons learned. 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) Project selection: The most striking aspect of this case is the enormity of the system in 
which EMS has become involved. In spite of the joke (by non-Brazilians) that everything 
associated with the country is "el mais grande do mundo", it contains more than a wisp of truth. 
One cannot fail to be impressed by the depth of intellectual capacity, the degree of organization at 
all levels (unions, industry, commerce, municipalities, NGOs, etc.) and, despite extensive 
poverty, the resources available for action on the sort of things EMS would like to see promoted 
through the small grants program. Aside from the above overall concept of the potential and 
actual capacity at the country level, Sio Paulo (state, metropolitan area and municipality) is seen 
as the leading edge of dynamism and, within Sio Paulo, the Municipality of Siio Bernardo del 
Campo is regarded as one of the best models in management to address the interface between 
environmental quality and urban poverty. 
In this context, the question is - has EMS got "a tiger by the tail", which carries the implication 
that, in this whirlwind of national, international and NGO financial and technical assistance 
activities that have been underway for two or three decades, measurable and attributable impact 
may not be possible to detect? If true, should EMS get involved with studies whose perceived 
impact will come largely from documentation and dissemination of an experience believed to be 
highly relevant in other countries? 
Inertia in both the political and operating levels of the municipality - the entity which ultimately 
must implement study findings: Clearly, this applies to all the municipalities which were 
recipients of small grants. But it is more evident in this case because of the high expectations 
(see Section 2). The issue is whether EMS should, a priori, expect a degree of inertia by the 
prime clients of the small grant program and build contingencies into the contact e.g. internal and 
multi-actor workshops, publication of reports (subject to a degree of quality control), workshops 
or targeted meetings with high-level municipal decision-makers to discuss report findings or 
formal presentation of reports. 
(ii) Realktic expectations from implementation of a $14,000 grant over a 6-12 month period: 
This issue stems directly from the above two. Even in relatively small municipalities such as 
Tom6 (Annex I), the dollar amount is not seen to be of major significance. EMS's contribution is 
the intellectual input on methodology and operational innovations through a reputable research 
center, backed by IDRC's own expertise, plus wide dissemination of experience through the web, 
high quality publications, meetings, etc. This goes back to the recurring theme of follow-up 
targeted at a specific impact or removal of a constraint not foreseen at the outset e.g. the inability 
of the municipality to involve CIESP more effectively. Further, there is a question of the relative 
emphasis in the small grant program to be placed on "process" and probabilities of impact in the 
particular municipal context, vis a vis the "product" - publications. 
(iii) Quality and timing of publications: EMS contracts call for final reports which, once 
approved, are put on the web. First, what quality control might be imposed prior to placing a 
report on the web? In the MSBC case, POLIS has introduced modifications to the report 
submitted by the municipality, and would have preferred to delay distribution on the web until 
these were incorporated. POLIS should have maintained better communications with EMS on 
this matter. Second, should EMS contracts call for publication of executive sumrnary-type 
reports which would provide the Secretariat with a point of entry for discussions with municipal 
executives on implementation and/or follow-up? In this case, the question of quality control is 
even more important. Third, if there is to be a publication, should EMS be concerned about 
delays of a year or so in its preparation and release? The loss of momentum in the MSBC case 
suggested that early publication may provide a useful platform to reinitiate the public-private 
partnership process set in motion by the project. 
ANNEX F - IMPACT OF PUBLIC - PRIVATE ASSOCIATION ON 
SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS : SAN 
FERNANDO MUNICIPALITY, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA 
Contract Procedures and Compliance 
The proposal was prepared by the International Institute for Environment and Development - 
Amkrica Latina (IIED-AL) in collaboration with the Municipality of San Fernando (MSF) and 
submitted to EMS on 2911011999. Reca~iqe, of thp internal r~giilatinns of t h ~  m~a~icipality, mder 
which any study contract (regardless of source of funds) has to be put out for competitive bids, it 
was decided that IIED-AL should be the prime contractor. The contract was signed on 12/5/2000 
and the first disbursement was made on 8/9/2000. The proposal specified a total budget of 
$26,000 - $14,000 from EMS; $7,000 from Aguas Argentinas S.A. - AASA - (the French 
company which took over water supply and sewerage services to the Buenos Aires Metropolitan 
Area in 1992); and $5,000 from MSF. The project was to be completed within six months. The 
draft report was submitted in April and the final version in June 2001 i.e. an implementation 
period of nine months. As a result of disagreement between IIED-AL and AASA over access to 
information, the latter reduced its participation in the study. 
The Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
MSF has a long history of association with consultants, NGOs and research centers. The first 
major study was made by FLACSO in 1987. This has been followed by a series of planning and 
infrastructure exercises related to environmental management -e.g. University of Buenos Aires 
1987/89, CFWLACSO/World Bank 1991193 and IIED-ALIUNDP 1993. It currently has projects 
with UNESCO, World Bank and GEF. 
Major changes were introduced by the current mayor in 1998/99 to take advantage of the 
evolving decentralization process in Argentina. It has become an active player in the association 
of four municipalities in the North Zone of the metropolitan area and the forum of 19 
municipalities which deal directly with AASA on water supply issues. This has also been 
presented as a "best practice" case of municipal management in a regional meeting sponsored by 
IDB as part of its Latin American urban project. Given this history, plus active support by the 
mayor and the Secretariat for Environment in MSF and an extensive association among IIED-AL, 
AASA and MSF dating back eight years, there was a favorable institutional context for the study. 
The Report 
The report is well documented as an evaluation of the extensive experience of IIED-AL in the 
four case study communities since the late 1980s. An interesting methodology is developed and 
applied in Chapter 3, where a double-entry matrix is used to plot a measurement of critical 
requirements of the 26 low-income communities in MSF against a measure of the feasibility of 
providing them with utility, social and financial services. From this an order of priorities for 
action is established in terms of the community and the type of intervention. Another useful 
contribution is the discussion of indicators of performance of the various actors in developing and 
maintaining water supply systems. The report is strong on methodology but lacks a clear analysis 
of options for interactions which might improve performance. In consequence the 
recommendations to implement seven actions (six to be undertaken by all four sets of actors and 
one by NGOs) lack operational content. Table 7.1 suggests 25 actions by the various participants 
in a public-private partnership. Questions not addressed include : planning, priorities, 
sequencing, coordination, costs and sources of financing. It could be argued that MSF and IIED- 
AL cannot be expected to address such questions with a budget of US $25,000 and a six-month 
time frame. This issue is taken up in Section 8. 
Municipal Participation in the Project Cycle 
Of the seven cases evaluated, this is the only report which reflects major inputs from the 
municipality. The Secretary of the MSF Secretariat for Environment played an active role 
throughout and drafted one chapter of the report. Aside from this, there was limited staff 
participation. There were no internal seminars to discuss the relevance of the study in spite of 
regular round table meetings convened by the mayor to arrive at collective decisions. One 
problem is the diversity of consulting, NGO, technical assistance, loan and inter-municipal 
initiatives under way at any one time in MSF. The fact that MSF is seen as a model and a 
laboratory in municipal management means that it attracts far more than average interest from 
external groups. In addition, during the period of study implementation and after, the 
municipality was under severe financial pressure. These circumstances made it difficult to 
effectively internalize the study as an input in decision-making on policy and policy 
implementation. 
One option for improving involvement of the municipality would have been provision in the 
IIED-AL contract for sub-contracting senior technical staff members on a part-time basis. This is 
accepted practice in Argentina out of office hours. 
Private Enterprise Participation in the Project Cycle 
This is the only case where there was explicit provision in the study contract for formal 
participation by a private corporation. The latter withdrew from the study for a number of 
reasons, among them confusion on interpretation of the role of IIED-AL as both a contractor and 
advisor to AASA and intermediary (and facilitator of community involvement) in relationships 
among MSF, the community committee and the water company.3 Another contributing factor 
was a difference of opinion related to the approach to be adopted, since AASA came late into the 
process of design. 
Impact 
(i) Capacity building in the municipality: For reasons discussed in Section 4, capacity 
building in MSF was limited to two or three staff in the Secretariat for Environment. Even 
though limited in number, participation of staff in applying IIED-AL methodology (structured 
and unstructured interviews, focus groups, community meetings, workshops with all four sector 
groups involved) represents a "new departure". In spite of the favorable institutional context 
(Section 2) the other secretariats appear to have been disinterested either in participating or 
learning from the methodology being applied in the study. 
(ii) Capacity building in the research center: The contract gave IIED-AL an opportunity 
to: (i) undertake a careful review of the literature. This revealed much material relevant to design 
of the Institute's programs; many of the reports reviewed applied to Argentina and particularly 
3 Tamargo, Maria del Carmen, "El rol de las alianzas pliblico-privadas en el context0 global-local", 
Medio Ambiente v Ubanizacibn, No. 57, febrero 2002, pp 4-12. 
to Buenos Aires; and (ii) undertake an in-depth evaluation of cases in which it had been involved 
for more than a decade. In fact it appears that this was a unique opportunity to update its thinking 
and classify the lessons from several years' working at the interface between MSF, AASA and 
four low-income community committees. It also provided the organization with higher visibility 
through presentation of journal articles and papers based on the study to both national and 
international meetings. 
(iii) Municipalpolicy: The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 are highly relevant to MSF policy. 
These derive from intensive interaction among the four actor groups and are aimed at evaluation 
and validation of behavior, inputs and outcomes for water and sewage supply in the four case 
studies detailed in Chapters 1, 3 and 4 and Annex 2. The chapters relate to - estimation of 
performance indicators for technical, economic, institutional and environmental aspects of 
providing potable water and sewage services to low income communities; and - the technical, 
financial, legal and institutional aspects of negotiating a contract between the state and a private 
corporation such as AASA which would involve participation by a complex hierarchy of public 
agencies at the federal, state and municipal levels and local communities as the ultimate users 
(purchasers) of the service. Under the prevailing economic situation in Argentina, it appears 
unlikely that MSF, in the near future, will take action based on these findings. Nevertheless, their 
relevance is not restricted to the short- run, so one could expect an eventual impact on policy 
change. 
As further discussed in Section 8, the five actions proposed to MSF in Chapter 7 (Table 7.1) are 
unlikely to change policy. 
Unfinished Business - Follow-up to Improve Probability of Impact 
Publication: The EMS study was undertaken in 2000. In 2001 IIED-AL undertook a study 
based on the same case studies (and it appears based on the same field work) for the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID).~ It would seem logical that DFID and EMS 
should push for a joint publication. 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) The operational relevance of study recommendations: This is an issue which applies to 
all seven cases evaluated. But it is thrown into particularly sharp relief in the MSF case because: 
first, the presentation and logic in the body of the report are excellent (reflecting an in-depth 
participatory exercise in evaluation of public-private partnership) with two chapters which are 
definitely policy relevant; and second, the Conclusions and Recommendations chapter has 
virtually no policy relevance. (Frequently, this is the only chapter likely to be read by a decision- 
maker in MSF, AASA or a community committee). It recommends five5 actions, each of which 
is to be undertaken by the four actors (AASA, MSF, community committees and NGOs): 
training in use of the water system 
environmental education 
training in rational use of water 
continuous dialogue among the actors 
= development of committees for maintenance of the water system. 
4 IIED-AL "Providing water and sanitation through public-private community collaboration : the 
experience of four low-income communities in Buenos Aires". 1991 (mimeo). 
5 A sixth action is assigned only to NGOs - strengthening local community institutions. 
Section 3 above raises a number of questions on operational aspects of this 5 x 4 "matrix" 
of actions. It is evident that with $25,000 and a six-month study period one cannot expect 
answers to these questions. They are nonetheless relevant and deserve discussion if these actions 
are to be mentioned. The lists of recommendations look almost like an after-thought, requiring 
minimal effort. They give an appearance of being selected at random - what about: 
internal seminars in AASA, MSF and NGOs 
creation of new departments or hiring of particular specialists in AASA or MSF 
dissemination of information in the mass media 
special programs for women 
training ot school teachers 
enforcement of water quality standards 
creation of special financing mechanisms 
etc.? 
Anything in these endless lists of desirable things could be discussed in the text as "necessary" 
conditions for change. But they do not constitute meaningful recommendations as they stand. In 
the MSF case perhaps a recommendation could be to hold a workshop attended by the four actors 
to discuss if, and how, action could be taken on the four points, or others. 
This raises a question of whether EMS should provide the research centers with advice on what 
sort of recommendations are likely to be convincing to decision-makers within the time and 
budget of the study. 
ANNEX G - PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN WATER SUPPLY TO 
COMMUNITIES CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME POVERTY: 
VILLA M A ~ A  DEL TRILTNFO MUNCIPALITY LIMA, PERU 
Contract Procedures and Compliance 
The proposal for this study was approved on January 27, 2000; the contract with the 
Municipality of Villa Maria del Triunfo (MVMT) was signed on April 14, 2000 and became 
operational with the first EMS disbursement on August 9,2000. Implementation of the study was 
sub contracted to t9e NGQ EcoCiudad. The ,myor playc:! an active rzle ir, the desigr. and 
implementation of the study, hired a sociologist (with grant funds) to be assigned to the project 
and named the Director of the Office of Public Services in the municipality as co-director. Given 
the time required to evolve the participatory approach applied, the draft report was not submitted 
till September 2001. In fact, the project continued with activities for consolidation of the newly- 
formed association of the water supply micro-enterprises until October, 2001 and the final report 
was presented 13/2/2002. All financial transactions between EMS and the municipality, and 
between EcoCiudad and the municipality, were effectively executed. 
The Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
This project was undertaken in a particularly propitious context stemming from the situation 
before, during and after its implementation. Between 1992 and 2002 the European Union (EU) 
invested $18 million in a program which helped establish 250 new micro-enterprises (Comite de 
Vigilancia del Agua Potable - COVAAP). These supply potable water to about 54,000 
households in the poorest communities of Lima. MVMT was a major beneficiary of this program 
with the establishment of 27 micro-enterprises. In addition EcoCiudad was extensively 
contracted by the EU to promote community organizations to execute the infrastructure work and 
provide training for formation of the micro-enterprise which subsequently managed the water 
system. Thus, the mayor and EcoCiudad had a working relationship going back a number of 
years. Further, with the progressive move towards decentralization, the mayor recognized that 
prior to 2000 the municipality had essentially been disinterested in the COVAAPs, and that the 
project offered a useful point of entry to generate greater community participation. He endorsed 
the project enthusiastically and sustained interest throughout its implementation. Aside from this 
unusually solid and continued political support, new developments since completion of the 
project suggest a favorable context for further evolving and applying the methodology and 
recommendations. The World Bank has recently approved a loan to Peru to carry forward a 
modified version of the EU program which had terminated in February 2002. 
The Report 
The report carefully documents an intensive exercise in participatory evaluation, facilitation and 
action-research. This is used to : promote the processes of creating and strengthening micro- 
enterprises to provide water supply and subsequently to consolidate themselves to provide other 
services demanded by the community; and generate mechanisms whereby rights and obligations 
are acquired by these enterprises through their new association with the municipality. The 
recommendations on measurement of performance criteria for the micro-enterprises and changes 
in policy and structure of the municipality to strengthen links to the private entities are. of 
necessity, general given the time available for the project and its complexity. 
There appear to be two important conclusions. First, micro-enterprises need to associate to 
facilitate their relationship with the municipality and improve their negotiating position in on- 
going operations. Second, evaluation of the EU model applied for 10 years suggests that, in light 
of action-research with the three micro-enterprises, marginal investment in time, training, 
participatory evaluation and facilitation (beyond the EU model) would have high pay-off in terms 
of financial viability, quality of service and sustainability of the enterprises in improving social 
capital. The contrast between the EU model and the EcoCiudad/MVMT model deserves further 
analysis than that given on page 49 and should be highlighted in the executive summary as the 
key element in replication of the methodology. 
Participation of MVMT in the Project Cycle 
The study proposal was drafted by EcoCiudad on the basis of its extensive experience as a 
contractor to the EU in implementation of its COVAAP program. It was discussed with the 
mayor and the Director of the Office of Public Services. The mayor saw the approach as relevant 
to promotion of a political agenda concerned with local participation in strategic planning, policy 
and programs in health and environment; with the expectation that the study could develop 
operational links with the micro-enterprises as tangible evidence of meeting the above agenda, he 
became a firm supporter. He followed the details of the study design, met regularly with the 
EcoCiudad project director and the Director of MVMT's Office of Public Services to approve 
operational plans and attended several meetings with COVAAPs, including two which resulted in 
formation of an association of micro-enterprises to deal directly with the municipal authorities. 
He personally approved the final report. The Director of the Office of Public Services was 
actively involved throughout and the promoters from the Office of Community Participation 
collaborated in field interviews and the convening of workshops with COVAAPS. However, 
there was little coordination among the municipal offices. There were no internal workshops to 
expose staff to the thinking behind the study. The research assistant contracted by the 
municipality in fact worked directly for EcoCiudad. 
Impact 
Capacity building in the municipality: The level of participation by MVMT staff in the study 
suggests little impact except at the level of the mayor and two directors. As a result of the study, 
social workers (promoters) from the Office of Community Participation have become directly 
involved with the COVAAPs as a routine part of their job. This should have a ripple effect on the 
way the municipal offices deal with micro-enterprises in providing public services and meeting 
community demands. 
Capacity building in the research center: EcoCiudad is basically a service-oriented NGO which 
facilitates organizational and operational aspects of community development, with particular 
emphasis on water supply, sewerage, solid waste management and health. The study provided 
the entity with an opportunity to : (i) review conceptual aspects in providing public services 
through community-based micro-enterprises and the types of support they might expect from the 
municipal government; (ii) evaluate the EU experience in creating COVAAPs; and (iii) 
experiment with activities complementary to the EU model (e.g. surveys, interviews, focus 
groups, intra-COVAAP workshops and training, and inter-actor meetings of COVAAPs with the 
municipality and central government agencies) designed : first, to improve the process of 
formation and sustainable operation of micro-enterprises and their capacity to provide quality 
service (water supply) and expand the coverage of services in response to community demands; 
and second, to formalize the rights and obligations of these enterprises in articulating demands for 
support from the municipality and complying with regulations. Successful completion of a study 
encompassing the above characteristics must be judged to have significant potential impact on 
EcoCiudad's future operations. 
Municipal policy: The study has clearly changed the way the municipality views its role in 
dealing with micro-enterprises that provide public services at the community level e.g. in areas of 
regulating quality of water supplied to the enterprises, education, adult education, health and 
formal registration of COVAAPs which facilitate credit availability. The municipality also 
intends to create an Office of Environment as recommended by the study. These changes 
suggests positive impacts. However, there is little evidence that the study has induced a demand 
for policy-related research by the municipality. All municipalities have an Office of Technical 
Cooperation and International Relations. This office is charged with formulating projects of 
interest to the municipality for presentation to national and international agencies or NGOs which 
provide technical and financial assistance. In the case of a resource-poor entity such as MVMT 
these projects, of necessity, depend on grants. Grant projects could well cover facilitation 
services of the type covered by the study - thus the potential induced demand is for services, not 
research on policy. 
To the extent that the experience receives wide dissemination within the metropolitan area (i.e. 
publication of an executive summary), the study could be expected to have a multiplier effect 
through influence on implementation of the $20 million World Bank loan which will be managed 
by the state corporation for water supply and sewerage in Lima - SEDAPAL - and executed by a 
consortium of nine NGOs. It will use the micro-enterprise model to extend water supply to 
marginal communities over the next two years in association with municipalities in the Lima 
metropolitan area. 
Unfinished Business - Follow-up to Improve Probability of Impact 
The municipality has requested additional funds from EMS to publish an executive summary 
report and assist in setting up the Office of Environment recommended by EcoCiudad. This 
request is still under consideration. Given the forthcoming World BanWSEDAPAL project, 
discussed in Section 5, there may be justification (from EMS's viewpoint) for considering support 
for publication. In that event, EMS should probably take a pro-active stance on quality of the 
product. The request for support to set up the Office of Environment does not reflect favorably 
on the overall management of MVMT i.e. it is apparently seen as another "project" which can be 
passed to the Office of Technical Cooperation and International Relations for grant funding. 
Apart from the fact that the approach suggests a lack of priority, the proposal appears to be 
outside EMS's mandate. 
The study has tested methodology for generating public-private partnership to provide potable 
water supply to poor urban communities through micro-enterprises. One question is the 
measurement of the performance indicators for COVAAPs and the municipality, listed on pages 
57 and 58 of the report. It appears unlikely that any effort will be made to monitor these 
indicators unless specific grant funding is provided. 
On the issue of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) it is worthy of note that, beyond an accounting 
of beneficiaries and investment, there was no in-depth evaluation of the EU-supported program 
which created 250 COVAAPs over a decade. Of the 27 COVAAPs formed in MVMT, 17 are 
still operational and are members of the association created during the study; two have been 
converted to service by SEDAPAL and the remaining eight have been disbanded. From this 
sample one might expect to derive lessons on the opportunities and constraints to improving 
micro-enterprise performance through stronger links to municipal authorities and more systematic 
efforts at the outset to put in place a more capable management structure (as proposed in this 
study). As a minimum, there would appear to be good reason to consider ex post evaluation of 
the three cases addressed in this study within three or four years. In the meantime, publication and 
dissemination of a summary report should be of considerable interest to municipalities directly or 
indirectly associated with EMS. 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) Terms of reference for a study where replicability is a major consideration: The MVMT 
case is clearly oriented to replication of a model(s) tested in the study. If this is established a 
~r ior i  as an objective. a number of aspects should be included which are either not dealt with or 
only lightly touched upon in the report: 
The type of expertise and time of each specialist required for the facilitation process 
The effort which should be made by the municipality - staff time, coordination, 
workshops, etc. 
The cost of the facilitation exercise - inputs by NGOs, municipality or others 
Evaluation of the NGOs' role as a necessary or sufficient condition for successful 
facilitation of viable efficient micro-enterprise operations 
Assessment of the operational aspects of monitoring and evaluation of performance of the 
public-private partnership - what will be measured, by whom and when? 
Evaluation of the critical mass of activities (sequence and relative weights) required to 
give "adequate" probability of success. The range of activities tested in the study 
provides the basis for reflection on this question. 
Publication of an externally reviewed summary report. 
(ii) Implementation time of the EMS contract: By any measure this case was action-research 
and probably more action than research! The period called for in the contract was six months. In 
fact, the final report was submitted 17 months after initiation, but work with the association of 
COVAAPs on conformation of the directorate and plan of work continued for another five 
months. At that time work was turned over to another NGO - FOBIDA. The implication here is 
that where a "study" involves facilitation of a public-private partnership for environmental 
management extended time periods may be required to reach an operational threshold. Where 
poor urban communities are seen as the owners and clients of existing or potential micro- 
enterprises there must be a considerable degree of uncertainty on time and effort to be put in by 
the "research center" before any conclusion can be drawn on whether formation, consolidation or 
improvement in management has been achieved. EMS-supported studies may range from 
feasibility analysis, to ex post evaluation for deriving policy implications, and on to action- 
research intended to put in place new institutional arrangements. The level of uncertainty and 
requirement for continuity of effort increase as one moves across the spectrum. 
ANNEX H - PUBLIC - PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN MANAGEMENT OF 
SOLID WASTE IN THE SAN SALVADOR METROPOLITAN AREA, 
EL SALVADOR 
Contract Procedures and Compliances 
The contract between EMS and the Council of Mayors (14) for the San Salvador Metropolitan 
Area (COAMSS) was signed in May, 2000. Implementation of the contract was covered under 
an agreement between: 
The Planning Office of COAMSS (OPAMSS) which provided : all logistical support; technical 
inputs; access to operating departments in the 14 municipalities which were required for technical 
support; access to the mayors as needed (separately and in regular meetings of the Council); and 
management and accounting of funds provided by EMS. 
The Salvadoran Program for Research on Development and Environment (PRISMA) which 
provided the study director. 
The System of Technical Assistance and Training for Development of Local Authorities 
(SACDEL) - a branch of the Latin American Urban Institute (IULA) - which provided the 
assistant study director. 
The contract became operational with the initial EMS disbursement in June, 2000. The final 
report was submitted by OPAMSS in February, 2001 (i.e. a ten-month implementation period) 
and approved by EMS in August, 2001 with disbursement of the final contract tranche. 
OPAMSS intends to prepare and publish 300-400 copies of the "final report". This report will in 
effect be a 15-20 page executive summary of the existing 123 page document, and will be 
presented in a formal meeting of COAMSS. In addition, this report should also be presented in a 
wider workshop attended by representatives of : municipal entities; small enterprises and 
cooperatives concerned with solid waste; the main corporate enterprise contracted by COAMSS 
for handling solid waste; NGOs and local community organizations. Aside from the delay in 
reporting, the contract appears to have been efficiently handled by all parties concerned. 
The Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
PRISMA took the initiative in preparing the study proposal and presenting it in a meeting of 
COAMSS. It was enthusiastically endorsed, without change, by the 14 mayors. In consequence 
OPAMSS was mobilized to give effective technical and coordination support. The stability of the 
municipal system, the technical capacity (particularly in the San Salvador Municipality) and the 
genuine interest of COAMSS were critical elements in a dynamic study process. Considerable 
momentum was generated through questionnaire surveys, individual interviews, two workshops 
on diagnosis of the solid waste management system with the 14 mayors, one workshop with staff 
of the Environmental Unit of OPAMSS and departments of solid waste in the 14 municipalities 
on options for change, and three workshops with small enterprises and cooperatives engaged in 
collection and transport of waste. In the presentation of conclusions and recommendations to 
COAMSS a facilitator was contracted, with a view to reaching decisions at this political level on 
some key strategic actions to be taken in the short and medium term. Some decisions were made 
and passed to OPAMSS for implementation. At that point momentum was lost. Two major 
earthquakes and a national election diverted the attention of policy makers and technicians. The 
project director in PRISMA changed jobs and OPAMSS did not have the entrepreneurial capacity 
to take advantage of the "political will" to move ahead. These circumstances presumably explain 
the 17- month delay in completing the final report and any follow-up. 
The Report 
The argument is logically developed and well presented. There is a clear statement of 
methodology with supporting annexes. The socio-economic/legaYinstitutional context is 
carefully documented. The text is forthright on the constraints to efficient management of solid 
waste - lack of norms and ordinances, and ineffective implementation of those that do exist; 
limited technical and managerial capacity of municipal and central government entities; 
corruption; mutual distrust among the key actors, leading to non-coordination; inertia; and 
political manoeuvres which stifle innovation and modernization in the system. The degree of 
transparency is surprising given the strong political and technical backing provided to the study 
by COAMSS and OPAMSS respectively. The metropolitan system, where ten of the 14 mayors 
are from the former "Revolutionary Front", reflects a remarkable level of resilience and 
sophistication. 
To a non-specialist there is an impressive analysis of technical issues associated both with 
management of solid waste and the conditions, negotiation, supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation of contractual arrangements with private entities (micro-enterprises, cooperatives and 
corporations). The test of relevance is that many managers in the municipalities use the report as 
a manual. As one might expect, these managers tend to consider the analysis and 
recommendations to be insufficiently operational for their precise needs. However, this was not 
part of the terms of reference (TOR) for the study. 
The study does not address the financial implications of implementing the recommendations. 
However, it appears that sufficient funds could be made available as, under 1999 legislation, the 
allocation of the central government budget to municipalities was increased from about 1% to 
7%, with 80% specified for investment and 20% for operations. 
There is considerable duplication in the report. But the proposed publication of an executive 
summary, if up to the same standard as the extended report, should have significant impact. 
Municipal Participation in the Project Cycle 
There was essentially no substantive input from the 14 municipalities into the study proposal. 
However, as indicated in Sections 1 and 2, there was significant participation by COAMSS, 
OPAMSS and the departments of solid waste in the various municipalities in study 
implementation, review of drafts, analysis of conclusions and recommendations, and adoption cf 
the strategic planning, structural and technical aspects of the recommendations. One could hardly 
hope for a better level of participation. 
Impact 
Potential impact of the EMS grant may be judged by its contribution to : (i) capacity building in 
the municipalities and in the two "research" entities responsible for implementation of the study; 
and (ii) change in municipal policy formulation and implementation through the vehicle of 
public-private partnership for environmental improvement associated with management of solid 
waste. 
(i) Capacity building: The 14 mayors and 30-40 senior managers and technical staff in OPAMSS 
and the municipalities were actively involved in the study. The fact that the study methodology, 
findings and recommendations are considered innovative and relevant to on-going operations, 
carries the implication of positive change in the way staff approach the technical, administrative 
and institutional/political aspects of providing public services such as solid waste recycling and 
disposal and street cleaning through contracts with the private sector. 
The relevance and capacity of the two research centers can hardly fail to be effected by 
association with such a successful project. The impact in PRISMA will be somewhat reduced by 
the departure of the project director. The impact in SACDEL may be expected to have 
multipliers since, under the umbrella of IULA, it provides technical assistance and training to 
municipal authorities throughout Latin America. 
(ii) Municipalpolicy: There is considerable resistance to the concept of using the private sector 
(including micro-enterprises and cooperatives) to provide public services on leftist ideological 
grounds. However, the study has heightened awareness of the advantages of partnership - access 
to financial, technical and managerial resources; support from NGOs; improved service to poor 
communities and greater participation; and generation of employment. The report opens the way 
for the municipalities to have greater confidence in negotiating with the private sector on an equal 
footing. Further, the study played a major role in the setting up of a special unit (UERS) within 
OPAMSS with responsibility for executing and supervising contracts in the solid waste sector. 
The IDB has approved an $80 million loan to El Salvador, 75% to be allocated to solid waste 
management. Given the level of interest, discussed above, this loan provides an excellent 
opportunity for leverage on policy change partly attributable to the grant. In addition, a proposal 
has been submitted to UNDP for $70,000 over one year to implement the recommendations of the 
report in two municipalities. The project will also develop a generally applicable ordinance 
covering municipal contracts with private entities in management of solid waste. Approval is 
expected by September, 2002. The expectation is that if this project is successful further funding 
will become available for implementation in the remaining 12 municipalities. It is worthy of note 
that, assuming this program comes about, the "impact" (which may legitimately be claimed by 
EMS) stems from the entrepreneurial ability of the study director, not from OPAMSS as one 
might have hoped. 
In spite of the loss of momentum following completion of the report, discussed in Section 2, the 
prospect is that the overall process of carrying out the study will have significant impact on policy 
change. Nevertheless, a constraint to implementation of policy on private sector participation has 
surfaced since completion of the report - a perverse new law (Ley de Adquisiciones y 
Contrataci6n de Servicios) which prohibits contracts with a term of over one year. This is clearly 
counterproductive for initiatives which require investment (and credit) in equipment and 
infrastructure. This illustrates the potential for "externalities" which may constrain impacts 
attributable to EMS's activities. 
One of EMS's main objectives from the small-grant program is to develop a market for policy- 
relevant research driven by demand from municipal authorities. This case suggests significant 
impact on municipal capabilities and policy, but it is by no means clear that it has generated a 
sustainable demand for research. The municipalities regularly use consultants in a project 
context. However, the idea of contracting a research center to undertake a program of 
investigation (or action-research) on policy or policy implementation (e.g. contracting procedures 
in public-private partnerships) appears to be in its infancy. 
Unfinished Business - Follow-Up to Improve Probability of Impact 
In this case there appears no reason to contemplate any further action by EMS beyond pressure on 
COAMSS (and indirectly pressure on PRISMA and SACDEL) to publish. EMS might consider 
sending a representative to attend the formal presentation of the report to COAMSS. The task of 
the representative would be the same as that proposed for the presentation to the La Paz 
Municipal Council (Annex C). 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) Project selection: By any measure, this case must be judged as EMS'S number one success 
story. If EMS judges its performance by the sort of impact discussed in Section 5, it should 
maximize the probabilities of selecting proposals of the San Salvador type. The corollary is that 
it should minimize selection of the La Paz type, where EMS faces the prospect of making high- 
risk salvage investments. 
How does one ex ante identify proposals with potential for tangible impact, aside from the quality 
of the proposal itself? Without being too tongue-in-the-cheek, success may be attributed to a 
stable municipal system, genuinely interested in improving its operations. More important is to 
select a project director who is not only well qualified, but is also an entrepreneur at heart, an ex- 
member of the municipal council and well acquainted with the vast array of technical and 
financial support in strengthening municipal ~ ~ e r a t i o n s . ~  In practice these selection criteria are 
not applicable. Thus, the focus becomes minimization of potential failures, e.g. in the La Paz 
case should EMS recognize it has "backed a loser" and cut its losses? If proposals are to be 
selected on grounds other than quality of the document, staffing and "apparent" municipal 
interest, then EMS will have to do more homework on each case. 
Another issue appears to be whether lessons learned from failure are equally as useful as those 
learned from success. If EMS sees its impact as direct as well as indirect in a wider context, then 
there may be merit in generating and disseminating knowledge on public-private partnerships for 
management of solid waste under different institutional conditions and applying comparative 
analysis to identify lessons which can be generalized. In this event, selection follows a random 
"democratic" process based on quality, where one is not trying to second-guess the institutional 
context and the result is a cross-section of experience. It is accepted that "good proposals and 
"good" studies may have low probability of having high, or even any, tangible potential impacts. 
(ii) The terms of reference: Consideration could be given to including in TORS aspects such as : 
assessment of the financial implications of implementing policy recommendations; publication 
of a "final" report as an executive summary; and formal presentation of that report in one or more 
multi-actor workshops or meetings. 
(iii) Attribution of impacts: By definition, the impact from injection of $14,000 (for joint 
action-research with municipalities, workshops, etc.) into an on-going and evolving process of 
decision-making in COAMSS, OPAMSS and 14 separate municipal bureaucracies, must be 
speculative and qualitative. In this dynamic multi-actor process it is clearly out of the question to 
attempt a counterfactual (without-grant) scenario. However, the San Salvador case is noteworthy 
6 Among the agencies active in this field in San Salvador are : the Carl Duisberg and Conrad 
Adenauer Foundations, UNDP, Habitat, IDB, World Bank, JICA, GTZ, USAID, IULA and Swiss, Spanish, 
Dutch and Swedish aid agencies, plus five national NGOs and six universities. 
because it probably represents one end of the spectrum of impacts which may be attributable to 
EMS'S small-grants program. It provides a useful yardstick against which the relative impacts of 
other cases may be judged. 
ANNEX I - DESIGN OF CONCESSIONS FOR PLANTS TO COMPOST 
ORGANIC SOLID WASTE MUNICIPALITY OF T O M ,  CHILE 
Contract Procedures and Compliance 
The contract with the Municipality of Tom6 was signed on May 2, 2000 and the study became 
operational on May 18 with the first EMS disbursement under the grant. The research was sub- 
contracted to the Centro de Educaci6n y 'Tecnologia (CET). The final report was submitted by 
the Municipality on June 16, 2001 i.e. a project implementation period of 13 months. The 
technical and financial reports were approved by EMS on August 12, 2001, thus there was full 
ccmp!isnce \~!itk! the contract. 
Institutional Context of the Project Cycle 
CET has been working with the Municipality of Tom6 since 1982 in a sequence of grant-funded 
activities all related to the center's speciality in community participation in all aspects related to 
the provision of social services - health, education, potable water supply, sewerage and disposal 
of solid waste. In addition, it expects to continue this relationship at least until 2004 with grants 
already negotiated. During much of this projected 23-year period, CET has been and will 
continue to work with 12 municipalities - "Association of Dryland Municipalities of the Bio Bio 
Region" (AMSRB). Throughout this time, aside from facilitation of community rnicro- 
enterprises, CET also provided training to municipal staff in the early 1990s. However, much of 
the experience accumulated over 14 years, which one would expect to be translated into policy 
change, was lost in 1996 when the incoming mayor replaced all senior staff, c.f. Annex C. Since 
then CET has rebuilt a solid relationship with the municipal authority. But this experience 
illustrates the institutionally unstable context into which EMS is introducing a study aimed at 
change in both the structure and technical capacity of a local government and its policies. 
Community development is a sensitive area and in the Municipality of Tom6 the department 
bearing this name is the political arm of the mayor. Thus, an NGO or research center such as CET 
might well be viewed with suspicion. However, the Center, as a local institution, has been able to 
establish considerable credibility. This has enabled it to maintain a relationship for over 20 years 
despite inevitable changes in leadership and accompanying policies. The first SRG to Tom6 
(1998) was coordinated through the Department of Administration and Finance. The present 
study was managed through the Department of Planning. As both had powers of coordination, 
this legitimized CET's "technocratic" role. In the present study the above three departments, plus 
the Departments of Environment and Solid Waste, worked effectively together through regular 
meetings with CET staff - an exemplary internal organizational context. 
Aside from the internal municipal context, CET (with the municipality) has maintained contacts 
with a wide range of donors plus central and regional agencies that provide grants or subsidies for 
local government activities. CET, partially on the basis of EMS-supported research, was 
instrumental in negotiating a $125,000 grant spread over 18 months from a Belgian NGO - 
Flandes - to implement some of the findings. In addition, AMSRB is negotiating a $750,000 
five-year grant from the EEC for institutional strengthening among the 12 municipalities which 
form the association. Further, there has been a continuous stream of subsidized support through 
regional and central government agencies. These tend to be designed by technocrats or 
politicians from the capital, and many may be classified as "clientist" without genuine 
consultation in the field. In a relatively small municipality such as Tom6 (population 40,000) 
which habitually confronts a scarcity of financial resources for its operations this type of 
"assistance" probably distorts policy in ways which may well limit the potential impact of an 
EMS research grant. Tome is certainly illustrative of the complex institutional contexts faced by 
local governments with restricted economic or political influence. The situation is compounded 
by limited technical and managerial capacity to formulate their own agendas. It may be argued 
that such municipalities might be considered "pawns" in the game rather than "actors". 
The Report 
The report is well presented and reads as a pre-feasibility study for organic solid waste 
composting plants. For this reason it has wide application beyond Tom6 as is pointed out in 
Chapter 4 on impacts. In practice, the study was undertaken in association with several of the 
municipalities in AMSRB. The research draws heavily on CET's previous work carried out over 
several years with community enterprises in Tom6 and the 1998 EMS-funded study of pricing 
solid waste disposal services in the municipality. If a summary report is to be published this 
background should be emphasized. 
Municipal Participation in the Project Cycle 
As indicated in Section 2, there was active participation by five department directors in regular 
meetings throughout the study. This is judged to represent a high level of municipal 
commitment. 
Impact 
Capacity building in the municipality: It is evident that senior staff in the municipality have 
benefited from association with the study. They are fully aware of the operational implications of 
the findings as well as the financial and political constraints in implementing them. However, 
there appear to be limitations to how far this strengthening process can go in a local government 
organization, such as Tome. Most staff are not professionals and even those that are seem fully 
occupied in administrative questions. An example is the Flandes grant to follow up an EMS 
study. Under this grant two consultants were assigned to the municipality and two social workers 
were contracted to work with the community enterprises. The objective was to establish more 
operational links between these actors. But, given the administrative pressures on municipal 
staff, the Flandes consultants tended to become absorbed into this aspect rather than breaking new 
ground in institutional relationships. Such conditions are not conducive to either creation of an 
autonomous demand for research by the local entity, or implementation of study 
recommendations. 
Capacity building in the research center: CET clearly values its intellectual links with EMS and 
has benefited from association with successful follow-up to the 1998 study and the opportunity to 
continue the development of other initiatives such as the Flandes grant. 
Municipal policy: The municipality intends to implement recommendations from the study. 
However, as suggested in Chapter 4 of the report, the collective impact on policy is likely to be 
much greater through multipliers in other municipalities or in regional or national agencies. The 
EEC grant should help multipliers in AMSRB. Findings may contribute to the design of a $2 
million regional program (30 municipalities) for solid waste management administered by the 
national council for environment (CONAMA). Recycling plants are planned in two neighboring 
municipalities with financial support from FOSIS and Fundo de las Amkricas. 
Unfinished Business - Follow-Up to Improve Probability of Impact 
The probability of potential impact from the grant appears reasonably high without follow-up. 
Nevertheless, two interrelated questions arise: Should EMS attempt to exploit the mezzo and 
macro context in which the Tom6 project is inserted? Should the Secretariat promote publication 
of a report summarizing the two CET SRG-funded studies and the Flandes follow-up experience? 
Issues Arising from the Case 
(i) Networking: The question raised in Section 6 suggests that networking at a sub-regional . 
level may offer an opportunity for the Secretariat to pursue its objectives. Should an attempt be 
made to identify such situations in advance, or to be opportunistic in exploiting cases such as 
Tom6 or MVMT. where possibilities emerge from the standard SRG process? Tom6 is a member 
of the 12 municipality AMSRB and a 30-municipality regional program for solid waste 
management. Could EMS facilitate exchange of knowledge focused on implementation of 
recommendations from case studies through a targeted grant? 
(ii) Site-specifcity versus generalization: The Tom6 case is much more technical than the other 
cases and is therefore more generalizable. However, it is probably easier to get funding for such 
approaches than for application of innovative social and participatory methodologies that 
characterize most of the cases which EMS supports. 
(iii) Innovation versus replication: Both the above issues center on the question of replication, 
rather than innovation. The Secretariat's emphasis on research suggests a focus on testing or 
validating innovative approaches to PPPs. It is to be assumed that replication will be carried out 
by national bodies or international entities such as the World Bank or IDB. Although this 
assumption is probably valid, the question arising from this case is should EMS have any role in 
promoting replication beyond dissemination of knowledge? 
ANNEX J - LIST OF CONTACTS 
IDRC 
Federico Burone, Director, Latin American Regional Office 
Walter Ubal, Executive Director, EMS 
Clara Saavedra, Executive Assistant, EMS 
LA PAZ CASE (BOLIVIA) 
Liliana Collazos, Study Director, Prohabitat 
Adolfo Novarro, consultant, Prohabitat 
Jorge Prcdenciz, ex Directcr, SR?3h4U, l8.lu9ici,ne!it)r cf L2 P2-l 
Mirko Rengal, Director, SIREMU, Municipality of La Paz 
Eduardo Machicado, SIREMU, Municipality of La Paz 
Miriam Kuchec, SIREMU, Municipality of La Paz 
SALT0 CASE (URUGUAY) 
Silvia Vitrale, IDES 
MSBC CASE (BRAZIL) 
Elizabeth Grimberg, Coordinator of the Urban Environment Section, POLIS 
Ver6nica Paulics, POLIS 
Sonia Lima, Director, Secretariat for Environment, MSBC 
Luiza Oliveira, Manager, micro-enterprise in solid waste recycling 
SAN FERNANDO CASE (ARGENTINA) 
Alexandre Brailovsky, Chief, Department of Community Development, AASA 
Ana Hardoy, Executive Director, IIED-AL 
Florencia Almansi, IJED-LA 
Gaston Urquiza, IIED-LA 
Iris Oliverio, IJED-LA 
Miguel Angel Otero, Secretary of Environment, Municipality of San Fernando 
Susana Carlino, Vice-President, Committee for San Jorge community 
Juan Duran, committee member, Committee for San Jorge community 
MVMT CASE (PERU) 
Oscar Butteler, Director, Secretariat for Public Services, MVMT 
Carlos Grey, Director, EcoCuidad 
Renzo Silva, consultant, MVMT 
Albina Ruiz, environment advisor, Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental 
SAN SALVADOR CASE (EL SALVADOR) 
RaGl Artiga, Study Director, PRISMA 
Manuel de JesGs Oliver, OPAMASS 
Rolando Almendirez, SACDEL 
Jorge Gonzalez, Manager, Environment Department, Municipality of San Salvador. 
TOME CASE (CHILE) 
Jorge Negrete, Director, Planning Secretariat, Municipality of Tome 
Rodrigo Lerzundi, Director, Administration and Finance, Municipality of Tom6 
Eduardo Letelier, Study Director 
